Full Issue 2.3 by unknown
Genocide Studies and Prevention: An
International Journal
Volume 2 | 2007 Issue 3 | Article 1
Full Issue 2.3
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp
This Front Matter is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Genocide
Studies and Prevention: An International Journal by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
(2007) "Full Issue 2.3," Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 2: Iss. 3: Article 1.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol2/iss3/1
Editor’s Introduction
Fourteen years have passed since the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, during which an
estimated 500,000 to 800,000 (or more) Tutsis and moderate Hutus died at the hands
of extremists Hutus. Rwanda is still in the process of recovering from the genocide,
which not only resulted in vicious and mass murder but virtually destroyed the
country’s infrastructure. Like any nation reconstituting itself in the aftermath of
genocide, Rwanda is experiencing growing pains. Survivors continue to suffer the ill
effects of what they were subjected to, witnessed, and lost. Many of the women who
were raped now have AIDS. Those who gave birth to what are commonly referred to as
‘‘rape babies’’ face additional psychological turmoil and, in many cases, are ostracized
by neighbors, friends, and family members. Many of the babies have been maltreated,
neglected, and even left to their own devices to eke out an existence on the streets.
Orphans fill orphanages, where many of the youngest children are raised by the
‘‘older’’ (often teenage) orphans. Groups of widows have banded together to provide
mutual support and get back on their feet while dealing with the absence of beloved
husbands and children. Many individuals are so scarred by what they experienced
and witnessed that they are not able to function and carry on normal lives. The
medical and social-services communities are stretched so thin in attempting to provide
assistance to those in need that people often fall through the cracks or simply do
not receive the treatment they need in order to fully regain their health
(whether physical or psychological). Some 100,000 alleged perpetrators still remain
in Rwandan prisons. Three different court systems—the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (Arusha, Tanzania), the national courts of Rwanda, and gacaca
(the adaptation of precolonial mediation and reconciliation processes to try, today,
those who are suspected of having carried out the killing and mass rapes) are currently
in operation.
At the same time, Rwanda has made a remarkable comeback. The country is,
for the most part, peaceful, and the people, for the most part, seem to get along, even
if their daily dealings with one another—particularly between those who considered
themselves Tutsi and those who considered themselves Hutu during the genocide—are
often tentative, if not tenuous. The national government has mandated that Rwandan
citizens are no longer Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa, as they were prior to and during the
genocidal period, but ‘‘simply’’ Rwandans. Some, and possibly many, look askance at
such a mandate, considering it naı¨ve at best and repressive at worst, but many others
seem to believe that, over time, it may be the best way to prevent future incidents of
mass violence. Time will tell.
Over the past fourteen years a massive amount of scholarship (including journal
articles and books) has been published on various facets of the Rwandan Genocide.
Some of it has provided a clearer understanding of how genocide unfolds—in
particular, how masses of people are induced to take part in the bloody and brutal
killing of former neighbors, friends, and even loved ones.
This special issue on Rwanda includes three articles based on field research
conducted in the hills, fields, and towns of Rwanda. The first, ‘‘A Calamity in the
Neighbourhood: Women’s Participation in the Rwandan Genocide,’’ is by Reva Adler,
Cyanne E. Loyle, and Judith Globerman; the second, ‘‘Interethnic Marriages,
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the Survival of Women, and the Logics of Genocide in Rwanda,’’ is by Anuradha
Chakravarty, a PhD candidate at Cornell University; the third, ‘‘The Dynamics of
Genocide,’’ is by University of Wisconsin at Madison political scientist Scott Straus.
Adler (Clinical Associate Professor in the Department of Medicine at the
University of British Columbia), Loyle (a graduate fellow in the University of
Maryland’s Department of Government and Politics), and Globerman (an associate
professor at the Institute for Health Promotion Research at the University of British
Columbia) focus on why women assaulted or murdered targeted victims during the
1994 Rwandan Genocide. During the course of their study, the three researchers found
that four experiential pressures, in various combinations, shaped the female
perpetrators’ decisions to participate in the 1994 genocide: ‘‘disaster mentality; fear
of the new social order; confusion or ambivalence about events on the ground; and
consonance and dissonance vis-a`-vis gender roles.’’
Chakravarty discusses the gendered dimensions of the genocide in Rwanda.
In doing so, she seeks to explain why Tutsi women married to Hutu men appear to
have had a better chance of survival than Tutsi women married to Tutsi men or even
Hutu women married to Tutsi men. Based on data from a field site in southwest
Rwanda, her findings and insights draw on the gendered, racial, and operational
dynamics of the genocide as it unfolded between April and July 1994.
In ‘‘The Dynamics of Genocide,’’ Straus delineates some of the many key findings of
his research in Rwanda, findings that constitute the heart of his new book, The Order
of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Cornell University Press, 2006). The
Order of Genocide raises critical questions about previous assumptions about the 1994
genocide (many of which have been taken at face value), and also provides new insights
into a variety of significant issues, including how the killing process spread across
Rwanda and why. Three specialists on the Rwandan Genocide—Lars Waldorf, who is
currently Lecturer in International Law and Human Rights at the University
of London and is writing a book on Rwanda’s gacaca process; Thierry Cruvellier,
a journalist and justice expert who has written a book on the ICTR; and Lee Ann Fujii,
a political scientist at George Washington University, who is in the process of
completing her own book on the 1994 Rwandan Genocide—were asked by the editor to
write succinct critiques of Straus’s research and findings, noting key strengths, any
weaknesses and gaps, and the likely ramifications of the findings.
Linda Melvern, an investigative journalist and the author of two notable works on
the 1994 Rwandan Genocide—Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (Verso,
2004) and A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (Zed Books,
2000)—contributes a provocative and insightful piece titled ‘‘The UK Government and
the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.’’ More specifically, Melvern focuses on the role of the
British government of John Major during the period of the genocide (April to July
1994), noting, and then discussing, the fact that in the United Kingdom neither
Parliament nor the press has attempted to account for Britain’s policies toward
Rwanda, and there seems to be an ongoing reluctance to do so.
This issue also includes a commentary by long-time Africanist Gerry Caplan.
In his contribution, ‘‘Rwanda (and Other Genocides) in Perspective,’’ Caplan examines
a host of issues but keeps circling back to one question: ‘‘What good has the UN
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide done?’’ He
also argues, and understandably, that ‘‘so long as the Permanent Five (P5) of the UN
Security Council have no will to intervene, or interest in intervening, in potential or
actual genocides, all the UN conventions, reports, and articles aren’t worth much at
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all.’’ In turn, Caplan prods us to ponder the real value of the proliferation of studies,
reports, journal articles, and books on genocide. It is an issue worthy of ample thought:
one genocide precedes another like clockwork in our world, and little or nothing has yet
been created, let alone implemented, to halt, let alone prevent, the one that always
seems to be just around the corner.
Undoubtedly, over time, many more studies will be conducted and many more
articles and books will be written and published about various facets of the 1994
Rwandan genocide. Those who undertake to write about Rwanda in the future would
do well to treat the subject as seriously and with as much care as those whose work is
represented in this special issue.
Samuel Totten
GSP Co-editor
Notes
1. Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2006), 12.
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A Calamity in the Neighborhood: Women’s
Participation in the Rwandan Genocide
Reva N Adler
Department of Medicine, University of British Columbia,
Cyanne E Loyle
PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of
Maryland and
Judith Globerman
Institute for Health Promotion Research, University of British
Columbia
Although public-health-based violence-prevention trials have been successful in a
variety of high-risk settings, no study has addressed the prevention of genocide, a
form of population-based catastrophic violence. In addition, little is known about
women who participate in genocide, including women’s motivations for active
participation in hands-on battery, assault, or murder. In order to explain why
women assaulted or murdered targeted victims during the 1994 Rwandan
Genocide, we interviewed ten Rwandan female genocide perpetrators living in
prisons and communities in six Rwandan provinces in 2005. Respondents’
narratives reveal two distinct pictures of life in Rwanda, separated by an abrupt
transition: Life prior to 6 April 1994 and Life during the 1994 genocide (6 April–15
July 1994). In addition, respondents described four experiential pressures that
shaped their choices to participate in the 1994 genocide: (1) a disaster mentality;
(2) fear of the new social order; (3) confusion or ambivalence about events on the
ground; and (4) consonance and dissonance with gender roles. The unique
combination of these factors that motivated each female genocide participant in
Rwanda in 1994 would shift and evolve with new situations. These findings may
have implications for understanding and preventing catastrophic violence in other
high-risk jurisdictions.
Introduction
Deaths due to genocide have exceeded war-related deaths in every historical period,
and were eight-fold higher in the twentieth century than in the sixty-nine preceding
centuries.1 This pattern has persisted into the twenty-first century as attacks on
civilians by governments and insurgents continue around the world.2 The rate of
genocide-related mortality is extremely high, far greater than rates for other global
pandemics, including HIV/AIDS and malaria.3 The health sequelae for survivors of
genocide include solid organ disease; neurological dysfunction; and psychiatric illness
that may be chronic, lifelong, and intergenerational, increasing the burden of disease
in affected communities for decades after the killing has ended.4 In order to accelerate
death and injury within victimized groups, genocidal regimes often target health-care
infrastructure and personnel for destruction,5 rendering them powerless to address
even basic public-health requirements amidst spiraling need. The global health
economy is invariably strained when scarce international resources are diverted out of
a necessity to address pressing crises in conflict zones.6
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The past fifteen years have seen at least three major episodes of genocide in close
succession; the most recent, in Darfur, continues at present without resolution or
international agreement on a strategy for peace.7 At the outbreak of each new event,
health professionals, researchers, and educators have called for diplomatic, military,
and humanitarian intercession when violence is imminent or when it is first
unleashed.8 Within a public-health construct, this form of intervention is known as
secondary prevention and falls into much the same category as urgent care in a
hospital for someone having a heart attack. This form of intervention may prevent the
death of the patient, and may ameliorate some disabilities when a problem is well
established, but, by definition, it cannot prevent the underpinning health problem
from developing. Secondary prevention of any problem is predictably expensive, as it is
an unplanned emergency response and relies heavily on costly technology and
personnel in accomplishing its goals.
As the science of violence prevention enters the global health mainstream, such
international organizations as the World Health Organization (in the World Report
on Violence and Health) and the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (in their report The Responsibility to Protect) have accelerated calls
for the primary prevention of extreme collective violence by studying its root causes
and developing anticipatory interventions that prevent extreme violence from
erupting.9 Primary prevention programs lower the likelihood of health problems by
addressing specific risk factors that contribute to those problems, years in advance of
untoward consequences. Using the example of heart attack, primary prevention would
include early diagnosis and treatment of problems that contribute to the development
of heart disease over the long term, such as high blood pressure and high cholesterol.
Universally, primary prevention is more effective and less expensive than secondary
methods, as it is a carefully planned response, addresses problems that are cheaper
and easier to treat, and forestalls the costly disability associated with entrenched
pathology.
One approach to the primary prevention of genocide, suggested by successful
public-health violence-prevention trials in a number of other high-risk milieus such
as prisons10 and inner-city neighborhoods,11 is based on identifying behavioral
and attitudinal risk factors for violence among individuals and groups years before
turmoil arises, then ‘‘treating’’ these risk factors through programs of family,
classroom, community, and media-based education.12 The goal of violence-prevention
programs is to lower the risk for hands-on violence among average community
members and groups during times of social upheaval. To optimize efficacy, such
initiatives are customarily developed to be synergistic with structural efforts to lower
violence, such as improved policing, criminal penalties, and betterment of social
conditions.
There have been few studies addressing the attitudes and beliefs that lead average
citizens to attack or kill unarmed civilians when goaded by genocidal regimes, and no
study to date has targeted modifying such risks in nations known to be at high risk for
catastrophic violence. Much of the published material in this area has been theoretical
or observational in design, and few authors have conducted research directly with
persons who have committed hands-on violence during a genocide or other forms
of catastrophic violence.13 This neglected avenue of inquiry is a critical element of
an interdisciplinary, inclusive approach to genocide prevention and provides the
foundation for the research discussed here.
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The women’s interviews conducted for the study Addressing the Root Causes of
Genocide, Phase 1 (ARC-G Phase 1), are analyzed in this article. The intellectual
framework for ARC-G, discussed in detail elsewhere,14 may be briefly summarized as
four interrelated segments:
Phase 1: To identify the attitudinal risk factors for genocidal violence among
individuals and groups in a retrospective sample of genocide perpetrators
in Rwanda
Phase 2: To identify the same risk factors, in real time, in a sample of persons at high
risk for genocidal behavior at present
Phase 3: To craft and implement public-health-based programs to lower the risks of
violence in the population described in Phase 2
Phase 4: To evaluate and refine Phase 3 interventions
The specific aims of the women’s subset of ARC-G Phase 1 (ARC-G Phase 1W) were
to (a) develop a theoretical model explaining why rank-and-file Rwandan women
assaulted or murdered targeted victims during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide
and (b) identify a group of attitudinal risk factors for genocidal behavior in
individuals and groups that would have the potential to be modified in long-range
public-health-based initiatives directed at preventing genocide in future high-risk
settings.
Background and Context
Worldwide, most crimes against the person are perpetrated by men.15 As a result,
genocide is more often than not characterized as a male crime,16 the outcome of
contemporary notions of masculinity,17 and, by some authors, as a specifically
gendered form of catastrophic violence.18 In contrast, women are frequently portrayed
as victims of genocide—through structural violence endangering the many domains of
human security, through interpersonal violence resulting in injury or death, and
through sexual violence that may be either random or organized.19
It follows, therefore, that the investigators who have explored the motivations of
genocide perpetrators have focused principally on male participants.20 Much less is
known about women who participate in genocide, including the structural circum-
stances that lead women to perpetrate genocide-related crimes, women’s roles in
initiating and sustaining catastrophic violence, and women’s motivations for active
participation in hands-on battery, assault, or murder.
Recent scholarship has attempted to elucidate the global macro-environment
surrounding many of the international episodes of catastrophic violence that occurred
between 1990 and 2000. For example, the collective violence in the African Great
Lakes region in the 1990s may, in part, be traced to the increase in structural violence
experienced in that region during the preceding decades. A steep rise in oil prices
during the 1970s gave way to a global economic downturn, falling commodity prices,
increasing national debts, and structural adjustment.21 These trends had a
disproportionate impact on poorer countries, contributing to crises of legitimacy
among ruling elites.22
The results of such global pressures on the security environment within tenuous or
failing states are numerous. In an environment of economic recession and vanishing
employment, leaders may choose to entice unemployed young men into military
service, while at the same time making scapegoats of minority groups in an attempt to
divert attention away from government culpability.23 Authors point to premonitory
Women’s Participation in the Rwandan Genocide
211
increases in arms stockpiles, the expansion of traditional military forces, and the
amplification of exclusionary or divisive ideology as signaling impending collective
conflict.24 The national consciousness may become focused on ethnic ‘‘purity,’’ or on
cleansing the nation of persons seen as alien or as dangerous to the nation’s vitality.25
Men may be called upon to fight or kill for the sake of ‘‘the nation’’ but, most
especially, to kill to protect women and children, who are envisioned in the national
consciousness as defenseless non-combatants. Women, on the other hand, may be
called upon to support sons, brothers, and partners in their masculine role as
‘‘defenders of national security.’’
These conditions were no less present in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994, during
the period of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion from Uganda and the
introduction of a multi-party political system by the 1991 constitution.26 However,
evidence from the Rwandan Genocide compels us to re-examine the specific roles of
women in collective ethnic violence.
Women’s involvement in the planning and implementation of the 1994 genocide at
all societal levels has been well described.27 Women’s participation ranged from
working as main architects of the violence to acting as individual killers in small
communities. Most commonly, women denounced victims and looted victims’ homes as
well as their bodies.28 Much less frequently, women killed directly, with a variety of
modern and more traditional weaponry.29
This characterization of women’s participation is supported by available statistics.
Only one woman, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, has been indicted by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), on charges that she incited troops to rape and
kill hundreds of women in the university town of Butare during the genocide; her trial
continues at the time of writing.30 Statistics from the Rwandan justice system indicate
that in 2004 approximately 3,000 women, representing some 3.4% of the Rwandan
prison population, were incarcerated in Rwandan prisons for genocide-related crimes;
the significant majority of these women have been charged either as accomplices to
murder or assault (for denouncing victims or roaming with attack groups) or as thieves
(for looting during the genocide). There have been no judicial executions in Rwanda
since 1998; only six women (0.2%) in total have been sentenced to death for genocide-
related crimes, and only one woman was in fact executed. The acquittal rate for women
charged with genocide-related crimes is 40%.31
A comparison to statistics for men in Rwanda makes clear the differences in hands-
on involvement in the 1994 genocide. For example, in 2002 alone, 1,909 men were
adjudicated for genocide-related crimes dating to 1994; seventy (3.6%) received the
death penalty, and 528 (27.6%) were acquitted.32 In 1998, twenty-one Rwandan men
were found guilty of genocide-related crimes, sentenced to death, and publicly
executed.33
Much of what we know about female genocide participants in all of these realms
has been gathered from the eyewitness accounts of victims and bystanders; little has
come from the perpetrators themselves. ARC-G Phase 1W was designed to address this
gap, as well as to explore the thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and beliefs of women who
perpetrated hands-on violence during the Rwandan Genocide.
Methods
Study Design and Participants
The sample was designed to represent the rank-and-file population of civilian women
who participated in crimes against the person but were not political, military, or
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attack-group leaders during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. The method used was
grounded theory, a qualitative technique used to form a testable theory about the
phenomena being studied based on the constant comparison of data within participant
interviews. At the conclusion of theoretical sampling, ten women who confessed to or
were convicted of Category 2 (murder) or Category 3 (assault) genocide crimes under
Rwandan law participated in the study. Study participants ranged from adolescence to
middle age in 1994. The sample comprised both urban and rural dwellers. In keeping
with grounded theory, sampling concluded when all categories of interest were
saturated (i.e., when researchers deemed that no new information on a particular
phenomenon was emerging from subsequent interviews). Theoretical sampling was
employed to capture target-population diversity. Selective and discriminate sampling
was used to ensure exploration of evolving patterns. In accordance with the constant
comparative method, new interviewees were identified to expand upon emergent and
absent themes.34
Because rates of literacy35 and telephone ownership36 are low in Rwanda, third-
party opinion leaders in prisons and communities in six Rwandan provinces—Kigali,
Kigali Ngali, Gitarama, Ruhengeri, Kibuye, and Gikongoro (see Figure 1)—recruited
study participants by word of mouth between February and April 2005. Opinion
leaders gave or read invitation letters to community members who met the study
criteria and obtained verbal permission for researchers to approach potential
participants in person (as none had phones or postal access). Interested individuals
Figure 1. Research sites (on map of Rwanda with 2005 provincial borders)37
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were provided with further information by the study team and given at least twenty-
four hours to consider their participation. All study participants took part in informed
consent procedures under a UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board certificate.
Interviewers and Interview Procedures
The interview team, whose members were supervised during data collection, consisted
of five trained, multilingual interviewers self-identifying as members of either Hutu or
Tutsi cultural groups and originating from four of Rwanda’s ten provinces according to
1994 boundaries. Data collection was carried out via a two-hour face-to-face semi-
structured interview, using Grant McCracken’s long interview method.38 The inter-
view guide was developed based on previous participant observation, key informant
interviews, a focus group, and pilot interviews and took a ‘‘life history’’ format. The
interview guide evolved as the interviews progressed to test and confirm emerging
themes and patterns.
All interviews were audio-recorded. Because audio-recording is prohibited inside
Rwandan prisons, special arrangements were made with the Ministry of the Interior to
interview prisoners in offices attached to but not officially located within the prison
enclosure. Interviews were conducted in the language of choice of the participant,
which for all participants was Kinyarwanda. Once interviews were completed, a
separate team of multilingual translators listened to the audio-recordings and, in a
single step, transcribed the interviews and translated them into English. Back-
translation, retranslation, and spot-check translation were used to optimize
precision.39
Data Analysis
Transcribed audio-recordings were loaded into Atlas.ti software and analyzed by two
researchers. Transcripts were examined according to McCracken’s method, using an
editing approach to text analysis in five stages:
(1) Detailed examination of individual transcripts for statements treated
independently of each other
(2) Analysis of individual statements for meaning
(3) Identification of themes and patterns
(4) Search for inter-theme consistency and contradictions
(5) comparison of themes between interviews).40
Following analysis of each transcript and development of data codes, the research
team identified and tested emergent theory.41
Results
Participant characteristics are shown in Table 1. All respondents reporting ‘‘no
income’’ were students. No participant experienced prolonged food insecurity in 1994.
Respondents’ narratives reveal two distinct pictures of life in Rwanda, separated by an
abrupt transition: Life prior to 6 April 1994 and Life during the 1994 genocide (6 April–
15 July 1994). For each time period, respondents described a distinct set of
environmental themes underpinning their everyday lives and thereby informing
their beliefs, behavior, and decisions. In addition, respondents described four
experiential pressures that shaped their choices to participate in the 1994 genocide:
(1) a disaster mentality; (2) fear of the new social order; (3) confusion or ambivalence
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about events on the ground; and (4) consonance and dissonance with gender roles.
The environmental themes reported here were influential among individuals and
groups not only during the genocide but also for years before it started and, most
likely, for years afterward. Experiential pressures emerged during the early days of
the genocide and, for some respondents, persist into the present day. The unique
combination of these factors that motivated each female genocide participant in
Rwanda in 1994 would shift and evolve with new situations.
A Brief Description of Study Participants
Respondent 1: A student who led the Interahamwe (Hutu Power militia) to a house
where victims were living
Respondent 2: A student who participated as a witness in an attack group
Respondent 3: A teenaged farmer who denounced victims being hidden by her family
Respondent 4: A teenaged farmer who denounced a child hiding in her neighborhood
Respondent 5: A teenager who denounced a friend from school who was hiding in the
bush
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of ARC-G Phase 1W respondents
Respondents
(N¼ 10)
Age (years)
Range 15–53
Median 17.5
Mean 22.5
Residence
Urban 5
Rural 5
Marital Status
Single 5
Married 5
Ethnicity
Tutsi 1
Hutu 9
Education (years)
Range 1–16
Median 6
Mean 5.8
Annual Income (1993 $US)
Range 0–2315.00
Median 0
Mean 534.57
Occupation
Farmer/landowner/herder 5
Student 2
Merchant at market 1
Accountant 1
Civil servant 1
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Respondent 6: A middle-class businesswomen who did not want to discuss the crimes
she was charged with
Respondent 7: An Interahamwe member who admits to murdering targeted victims
during the genocide
Respondent 8: A merchant who denounced roommates
Respondent 9: A local official who distributed weapons and detained victims
Respondent 10: An educated worker in a large business who denounced neighbors
Environmental Themes
Life prior to 6 April 1994
Under Rwandan law prior to 1994, men sat as heads of household and women were
barred from inheriting property, entering into any legal agreement, or opening a
bank account without spousal permission. On average, women were less educated than
men, and few women held positions of authority within any echelon of government.42
In Rwandan communities prior to 1994, gender roles for women emphasized hard
work without complaint, homemaking, rearing and disciplining children, faithfulness
to partners, and (for women with farms or gardens) making a success of subsistence
agriculture. Some authors point to subtle changes in the conception of ‘‘femininity’’ in
Rwanda starting with the national pogroms of 1973, when women first participated in
‘‘national security’’ activities by harassing, denouncing, or assaulting Tutsi women
in their schools, workplaces, and communities.43 Nonetheless, the majority of
Rwandan women in 1994 adhered to the traditional expectations of homemaking,
childrearing, and creating community between households.
On the other hand, men were seen as family ‘‘breadwinners.’’ Rwandan men were
respected for ‘‘observing much and saying little,’’ providing financially for their wives,
educating their children, protecting their families, and defending their communities
(fromexternalthreatsaswellasfrommorecommonplaceviolence).Menmadeupthelarge
majority of Rwandan soldiers, legislators, andmunicipal officials. Menwere responsible
formost national and local security functions before and during the 1994 genocide.
The narratives of female participants in the Rwandan Genocide elaborate a picture
of Rwandan life before 1994 that was centered on close-knit neighborhoods, community
cohesion, and the principle of mutual aid. Families, regardless of ethnicity, cooperated
with each other in cultivating crops, maintaining infrastructure, and sharing
resources in good times; in times of emergency, they relied on one another to share
food when crops failed, and to support widows and orphans in need:
Respondent 4: We invited each other to help in cultivating one’s piece of land in
turns. We invited each other to weddings and even helped each other
in hard times, such as carrying the sick to hospital or burying the
dead . . .
Respondent 10: We got along with our neighbors. We had no problem with them. We
shared what we had. I used to call some of them my fathers-in-law
and my godmothers. I felt I was really in a family.
Although most respondents describe a life free of ethnic considerations or conflicts,
women from the north of Rwanda (where the ruling MRND party originated) report
a background regional climate based on exclusionary ideology and ‘‘hidden’’ ethnic
tensions:
Respondent 8: Young people weren’t allowed to marry Tutsis, and leaders discouraged
such weddings.
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Respondent 6: Before the genocide, people were interacting, but not satisfactorily.
The war that broke out in 1994 had also broken out in the 1960s and
1959, and it just kept on going, though some people tried to hide it. So,
whenever and wherever you went to settle down, you could see that
ethnic considerations were instilled in the people . . .
When the RPF invaded Rwanda in 1990, few respondents noted any change in
day-to-day community relationships, although northerners, along with residents of
Kigali, report that prominent Tutsis, as well as families whose children had
left Rwanda to join the RPF, were gradually marginalized as ‘‘enemy collaborators.’’
Tutsi and Hutu supporters of the RPF were forced underground:
Respondent 8: After the Inkotanyi [the RPF] invaded the country, Tutsis were no
longer respected as people who had rights as citizens.
Respondent 6: The people who wanted to follow the RPF political party working
outside of the country had to do it secretly . . .We simply felt that we
had been invaded by inyenzi [cockroaches].
With the introduction of multi-party politics in Rwanda in 1991 tensions within
communities intensified, both between Rwandan ethnic groups and also among
members of the same ethnic group who joined different political parties. Animations
(political rallies aimed at recruiting and ‘‘energizing’’ party members) became common
in most parts of the country. Battles over political influence frequently turned violent.
However, although Tutsi Rwandans became more of a national target during this
period, respondents report that relationships between neighbors of all ethnic groups
remained more or less intact:
Respondent 1: Let me say a bit about the multi-party period, just before the killings
started. At that time, there were many parties, all of them officially
sanctioned, but the members of one party would attack members of
another simply because they were jealous that certain parties were
attracting more members.. . . This was all about jealousy and greed.
Respondent 7: We [neighbors] interacted agreeably and we had no misunderstand-
ings, but thereafter we disengaged ourselves. This problem arose
because of our political involvements.
Political discord on the community level also divided some families:
Respondent 3: My dad had nothing against [Tutsis], but my brother was against
Tutsis because he was with the killers . . .People used to call Tutsis
inyenzi [cockroaches], but in my family Tutsis were respected . . .My
dad used to tell us that he didn’t believe what people were saying
about Tutsis, and that they were human beings like us, and that it
wasn’t true that they wanted to kill Hutus.
Life during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide
The narratives of our respondents change abruptly as they begin to speak about
6 April 1994, when the plane carrying Rwandan President Juve´nal Habyarimana
(as well as the president of Burundi, Cyprian Ntayamira), was shot down. Respondents
experienced this event as a critical assault on national sovereignty, placing Rwanda in
an official state of emergency. Interim government leaders swiftly moved to blame the
incident on the RPF,44 and all Rwandan Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus were
just as swiftly labeled ‘‘enemy collaborators.’’
The downing of Habyarimana’s plane had the immediate effect of increasing the
militarization of the entire country, a move pre-planned by Hutu Power militants
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months earlier.45 Militarization was framed as critical to ‘‘national security’’ and
encompassed not only the armed forces but also a large proportion of Rwandan civil
society.Over thenextmonths,menandboyswithoutmilitary experiencewere recruited,
trained, cajoled, and coerced to join civilianmilitias acting as extensions of the Rwandan
military. In early April, the Rwandan armed forces, civilian militias, and their local
supporters proceeded to round up and kill Tutsi men as well as prominent opponents of
theHutuPowermovement.Later,women,girls,andyoungerchildrenwerealso targeted.
As for the rest of thepopulation,non-targeted civilians, particularlywomenandchildren,
were instructed to remain indoors and ‘‘out of harm’s way.’’
Respondent 8: News of the death of the president begun to spread the following
morning, and the Interahamwe were going around telling people that
their enemies had killed their president. Leaders ordered people not to
leave their houses.
Respondent 9: Personally, I never knew that a war would start. We shared everything,
and then abruptly we heard that they had shot down Habyarimana’s
plane. I think this was the cause of the killings that took place.
Respondent 2: People used to say that Tutsis were spying for the Inkotanyi [the RPF]
and that the Inkotanyi wanted to kill Hutus . . .Sometimes people said
they were killing inyenzi [cockroaches], as if they were not killing
human beings, and that to kill Tutsis was like self defense, because
people were saying that Tutsis were about to kill Hutus.
After early April 2004, governance in Rwanda devolved to a complex network of
government, military, and Interahamwe extremists working in loose affiliation, as well
as individually, at national, regional, and local levels. During the genocide, ad hoc
leaders in all social strata mobilized citizens to denounce, rob, and kill targeted Tutsi
and Hutu victims—by planning and importing weapons from abroad, by assassinating
formal leaders who would not cooperate with the Hutu Power agenda, by commanding
the Rwandan armed forces and Interahamwe militias to attack and kill unarmed
civilians, by disseminating misinformation about the RPF and Tutsi civilians at the
national and local levels, and by bribing and coercing average civilians to participate in
the mayhem. The impact of manipulative and destructive leadership on the attitudes,
beliefs, and behavior of most Rwandans during the genocide was noted by a large
majority of respondents:
Respondent 4: I think it’s the leadership that was in place [that is to blame for the
genocide], because if they had punished those who killed first as an
example, the killings wouldn’t have escalated. However, the leaders in
place then were very greedy people, and they wanted to stay in power.
[Interviewer]: Who do you think could have stopped the killings but did nothing . . . ?
Respondent 7: The leaders, because they helped us and incited us to continue the
killings, while they were the ones who were supposed to condemn such
atrocious acts.
Respondent 8: Let me tell you, leaders played a big role in the killings, because they
came and told us that our Tutsi neighbors were going to kill us, and
that [the Tutsis] had guns in their houses . . . In addition, many of us
were poor, and [our leaders] were telling us that we could keep our
neighbors’ belongings.
Experiential Pressures: Explaining Calamity
As previously mentioned, the female respondents who participated in ARC-G Phase
1W describe four distinct experiential pressures driving their decisions to participate
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in hands-on violence after the death of Habyarimana: (1) a disaster mentality, (2) fear
of the new social order, (3) confusion or ambivalence about events on the ground, and
(4) consonance and dissonance with gender roles. Each of these will be discussed here
in some detail.
Disaster Mentality
Within hours of the downing of Habyarimana’s plane at Kanombe Airport, women
report, many sectors of Rwandan society went into an immediate state of crisis.
A large proportion of female respondents describe knowing that something devastating
had happened not only to their country but also to their communities and their
everyday lives. Faced with this unparalleled disaster, and fearing that Rwanda was
ungovernable without Habyarimana, most respondents felt the urgency of finding
new answers to their predicament.
This omnipresent mood of disaster had a variety of effects on the emotional
states of respondents; some report feeling unnerved or panicky, while others felt
despondent and hopeless. Still other respondents remember feeling outraged; they
quickly moved to revenge Habyarimana’s death by attacking unarmed Tutsi civilians,
all of whom the government characterized as RPF collaborators and thereby
responsible for the death of the president.
Respondent 7: I heard on the radio how the plane was shot down, that citizens weren’t
supposed to scatter and a curfew was imposed . . .After hearing this, I
never left home, thinking that if I did I would die, leaving my kids to be
orphans, which wouldn’t have been the right thing to do.
Respondent 6: The average person wanted to die, for life had become meaningless.
Can you imagine seeing a man slaughtering his fellow men? . . .The
country you saw, it belonged to the beasts.
Respondent 8: We people [from the north and west of Rwanda], we were really sad
because we had lost our president, who was so important to us . . . and
we were revenging his death. People from other regions were jealous of
us [because President Habyarimana had favored people from his own
northwestern origins] and we knew it, so when the president died we
felt as if they were in one way or another responsible . . .People really
hated Tutsis because everyone knew that they were in support of
Inkotanyi. We thought that Tutsis would all be killed, and that nothing
would happen afterwards, that no one would be punished for having
killed them.
Fear of the New Social Order
Rwanda’s social fabric deteriorated in the post-Habyarimana period, as violence
accelerated into chaos. Many respondents describe a social environment that was
incomprehensible, dangerous, and terrifying; despite the advancingRPFandubiquitous
anti-Tutsi rhetoric, women most feared fellow Hutus involved in genocidal activities.
Respondent 4: I was terrified because there were screaming and wailing all over the
place, and whistles were blown and men ordered to go to night patrols
and roadblocks . . . I even asked why they were killing the Tutsis and
they told me that Tutsis had to die. I always thought that [Tutsis] were
innocent and being victimized.
Respondent 6: Whenever something made a slight noise, you felt [the extremists] were
coming to kidnap you. You could see abducted people being led
away . . .You felt you could not believe anyone. You did not even
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understand how such things could be happening. Things were
unbelievable. What happened in April was extremely bad.
Although women were directed to remain at home, they were also expected to
maintain the traditional female roles of running the household, caring for children,
and supporting the men of the family, all in increasingly perilous surroundings.
Obtaining food and water became progressively more dangerous amid escalating
community violence, and women had difficulty moving about freely for fear of being
injured or killed in the melee. This had a multiplicative effect on women, who felt
increasingly under threat even though they were not members of targeted minority
groups.
Respondent 1: . . . The place where we used to fetch water was too far away and we
were supposed to pass by roadblocks. The document certifying that I
didn’t have a national identity card (because I was a minor) was denied
to me. So one day, they arrested me and ordered me to sit at the
roadblock where they asked me a lot of questions trying to find out if I
was really Hutu.
Respondent 2: My role was that I witnessed people killing someone . . . I saw a group of
people going down to the river with a man and [I saw them] kill him
there . . .Of course, there were people who just watched others being
killed, and had the means to save them [but did nothing].
Respondent 2: I think [people] were afraid to stop the killings, fearing to be associated
with Tutsis.
Some respondents found it necessary to find new ways to ensure their safety as
well as to procure the necessities of life for themselves and their families.
Respondent 1: The following day, a soldier, whom I knew, came and said, ‘‘I don’t want
you to be short of water. That’s why I suggest you always to go with our
people’’ . . . I was scared. The following day he told me, ‘‘Before you fetch
water, come to see me so I can lend you my military shirt.’’ So I agreed.
I put that shirt on every time I needed to fetch water. I always went
with his people. Sometimes, it was very hard to pass depending on
which Interahamwe were on the road . . .Some of them were more
terrible than soldiers.
Confusion or Ambivalence about Events on the Ground
Homebound and fearful, Rwandan women faced significant obstacles when they tried
to gather information and frame opinions about the escalating violence in their
communities. This, in turn, placed women at a disadvantage in trying to construct a
comprehensive picture of their ‘‘new world,’’ as well as in making informed decisions
about their personal actions under the circumstances.
Respondent 1: . . . Women and girls are supposed to stay at home and look after the
house. Men are the people who spend all their time walking and going
to bars . . .People say that a lot of things [during the genocide] took
place in bars. In Rwandan culture, no woman can spend a night in a
bar. I think the difference lies in the fact that women are supposed to
stay home, but men are always moving.
At the same time, however, women were also expected by armed killers to
participate in the genocide by denouncing victims, looting and burning local
properties, and lending support to the homicidal agenda of extremists. The majority
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describe confusion regarding what to think, how to feel, and whom to believe about
the unfolding genocide.
Respondent 2: In our area, the situation was normal and calm, but at the end of
April some people started to flee. . . . A few days later some people in
our area started to sing songs about exterminating [Tutsis] . . . I
couldn’t understand how people could kill each other without a reason.
Respondent 1: I heard people saying . . . that [Tutsis] were enemies of the state. . . . The
people being killed were our neighbors, and the family had children I
grew up with, went to school with. . . . So how can someone say that a
fourteen-year-old kid is an enemy of the state? . . .People kept saying
that Tutsis were state enemies, but there was nothing, either in our
conversations or our daily lives, proving that it was true.
Similarly, many respondents describe their involvement during the genocide as
being haphazard or situational, rather than informed by thoughtful deliberation or
strongly held views. Some women describe responding ‘‘in the moment’’ to provocations
for violence, without significant forethought or malice toward victims.
Respondent 5: There was once when I went to fetch water down a hill [that] I heard
people from across the other hill screaming. Then a girl came running
and she hid in a bush that was nearby. I saw her and didn’t say a
word. . . . I then started heading home, but before reaching home I
encountered some other kids my age who asked me about the
screaming. I told them what had happened [and] where she was
hiding. I didn’t know they would give her up. . . . I went home and after
a short while one of my cousins passed by our compound with the girl
in his arms and [he] . . .killed her. I confessed because I knew that if I
had kept my mouth shut . . .nothing would have happened to her . . .
[Interviewer]: Personally what were your feelings then?
Respondent 5: I was terrified and miserable.’’
Respondent 3: My dad’s Tutsi friend was hiding in our house and they kept asking my
father if that man was there, but always he denied it. One day I told my
brother that the man they were looking for was hiding in our house,
and they went and found him there. . . . I didn’t do it because I hated
him, or Tutsis, but because my brother promised me that he wouldn’t
kill him and gave me some gifts. . . . Eventually they took [my father’s
friend] away and killed [him]. That’s when I started to feel guilty and
my heart was telling me that I had committed a sin.
Respondent 9: A man came with his assault group and I heard that he had family ties
with Habyarimana. He came and said to me severely, ‘‘You, local
leader, I want you to protect these people.’’ I thought that killings
wouldn’t reach our home area. When he came back he gathered the
people in my compound and clubbed them to death. . . . I was shocked
because I didn’t know him and didn’t know his intentions. He went
for one minute and came back. I never knew that he was going to
kill them.
Consonance and Dissonance with Gender-Based Expectations
While many women attribute their involvement in the 1994 genocide to spontaneous
or poorly considered behavior, some participated deliberately and with conviction.
The ambient themes that conditioned Rwandan women to participate willingly in
the genocide, as discussed above and elsewhere, include destructive ideology,
rapid militarization of civil society, fear of extremist governance, greed, and
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overpowering social upheaval. Men and women alike were caught up in the ‘‘total
environment’’ imposed by these mutually reinforcing factors.46
Women participated in the RwandanGenocide one of twoways:more ‘‘passively,’’ by
cheering killers on, looting property, and denouncing victims; or more ‘‘actively,’’ by
working with attack groups and personally assaulting targeted individuals. The former
group of women, comprising the large majority of willing genocide participants,
conductedthemselveswithinthe limits forgedduringthe1973pogroms.Whileremaining
within traditional gender norms with respect to spouse, home, and family, these women
nevertheless lent support to the eliminationist Hutu Power agenda by egging on attack
groups, informing on concealed victims, and pillaging property from the dead.
Women describe being influenced by a subtle and complicated interplay between
accepting their role as homemaker and compliant spouse and, at the same time,
forming and acting on political beliefs in making decisions to participate in genocidal
activities:
Respondent 10: [Women] were supporting their husbands to carry out killings.
You may even find such women here in prison, who defend
themselves by saying, ‘‘My husband was called upon to go to a
road block, and do you think I could stop him?’’ or ‘‘My husband
would ask me for his machete, and I knew where it was, so do
you think I could refuse him?’’ Though you could not avoid doing
it, why did you also cheer [the killers] on, or undress and plunder
the victims? It was because you were happy that [Tutsis] were
dying.
Respondent 8, a woman who reports feeling no personal animosity against Tutsis
prior to the start of the 1990 civil war, is imprisoned for having denounced one of her
Tutsi housemates at the outset of the genocide. Because Respondent 8 worked outside
the home, she witnessed numerous episodes of harassment and arrest in the years
leading up to the genocide and was accustomed to political discussion and debate.
Respondent 8: Life wasn’t good at all [prior to 1994] because of the
Interahamwe . . . [who] were stealing things from people who were
coming from the market, especially those who looked like
Tutsis . . . If you didn’t have money to pay them they would throw
your goods on the ground . . . I remember during the peace negotia-
tions some leaders used to say that there wasn’t enough space for all
Rwandese, that it would be better if those who were outside the
country did not come back. I think they killed Tutsis who were
inside the country to discourage those who were outside from
returning. Their interest made them to lead people into genocide.
Her family was poor, and Respondent 8 relied on the generosity of her neighbors
to make ends meet. They lived in a neighborhood where Interahamwe also resided,
and she was married to an Interahamwe member who died during the genocide.
Although Respondent 8 never killed anyone herself, she was nevertheless forthright in
describing her belief, in 1994, that all Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus were
potential RPF collaborators and therefore a dangerous threat to the safety of Rwanda
and Rwandans:
I considered them to be my enemies because they had killed our President and now they
wanted to kill us. For me the wisest thing to do was to kill them . . .There were some
Hutus who opposed the government, so they didn’t kill and were treated as traitors, or
spies for the Inkotanyi. I believed what was said about them. I considered them naı¨ve.
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Thus, within the limits of a more traditional gender role, Respondent 8 encouraged
and supported her husband, friends, and neighbors in prosecuting the genocide,
even going so far as to return home, after fleeing her neighborhood for safety, in order
to keep house for her husband:
When the fighting was approaching our neighborhood . . .we decided to go and seek
refuge elsewhere . . . but my husband didn’t stay there for long and he decided to return
home. One day I met him coming to look for me. During the genocide my
husband . . .wanted me back home.
During her interview, this respondent accepted responsibility for her actions and her
contribution to advancing the genocide:
Men were more active in the killings, but women played a big role in the killings as well,
because they could have advised their husbands not to kill innocent people.
Finally, despite constraining her behavior to norms that would have been acceptable
for Hutu women during the 1973 persecution of Tutsis, Respondent 8 did not escape
the scorn of family and society when her crimes became known:
When I went back home, my mother asked me if I wasn’t feeling bad about things that I
did in [the genocide] . . . and I told her that I never did anything bad . . . I don’t know
what they think now. Perhaps they think that I lied to them, [because] they don’t come
to see me.
Those who themselves killed victims were a small minority of Rwanda’s women.
Fewer than one in ten members of the Interahamwe militia were women who received
‘‘civil defense’’ training prior to the genocide. Because participation in hands-on violence
was considered to fall outside gender-based norms for women in 1994, this small group
of women not only took on the role of killer but also faced community censure for
stepping outside traditional gender constraints. Some women who agreed to join the
militias had reputations for challenging limits in other spheres and may have become
involved precisely because of their familiarity with crossing social boundaries.
Respondent 10: There were some bad-mannered girls whose friends were
Interahamwe. They must have walked together with their
Interahamwe boyfriends and thus saw their deeds. When you keep
on exchanging ideas with someone, you may find room within
yourself to accommodate those ideas. That’s why some women
participated in the killings.
Of the ten women whose interviews are analyzed here, Respondent 7 was most
forthcoming in describing the complex relationship between personal and external
pressures driving her decision to kill at the outset of the genocide. Respondent 7 and
her husband both joined the Interahamwe militia in the early 1990s. She reports being
a heavy drinker and marijuana user prior to being recruited, activities that fall outside
of the customary boundaries of ‘‘appropriate’’ behavior among Rwandan women even
today. Respondent 7 received military and weapons instruction prior to the genocide
and was told she was being prepared to go to war as well as to ‘‘exterminate Tutsis.’’
Although never an enthusiastic supporter of Hutu Power herself, she responded to
pressure from her husband to get involved in Interahamwe activities:
Respondent 7: There came a time when [my husband] tried to sensitize me [to Hutu
Power ideology] . . . I then thought, ‘‘this is going to be difficult for
me,’’ but he told me that it was obligatory . . .Personally I never was
on their side, but my husband once said to me, ‘‘If you don’t take
part, I will kill you myself.’’ So I agreed to participate.
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Thus, with military training and a husband committed to the cause, in the early days
of the genocide Respondent 7 agreed to kill a group of targeted civilians in her
neighborhood. Traumatized by her actions and determined not to kill again, she
nonetheless had difficulty withdrawing from Interahamwe attack groups:
They sent me to a homestead while armed with a rifle and when we surrounded the
house I shot . . .people inside. I regretted it after I killed them. I knew that I had done
something wrong and I felt that if I continued killing I would also die. I went home and
told my husband how I had decided not to [kill again]. I told him, ‘‘these were my
neighbors and their deaths have upset me, so I won’t repeat [killing] anywhere else.’’ He
told me then, ‘‘If you don’t continue . . . you will have to die also.’’ . . .Thereafter, I kept
the rifle but avoided him.
Despite accepting non-traditional gender roles ‘‘for the sake of national defense,’’
the few women who did receive militia training were not relieved of their customary
responsibilities at home. Women combatants were expected to fulfill novel and
traditional roles simultaneously, both while training with militias and, later, while
participating in the genocide itself.
Respondent 7: Although they trained and sensitized me, I was never interested . . . I
was trained for one month and then stopped. They then asked me,
‘‘Have you mastered it?’’ And I said, ‘‘Yes.’’ I went home and continued
my life, but when the war broke out they gave me a rifle and ordered
me to kill people . . .
[Interviewer]: Why did you stop the weapons training sessions?
Respondent 7: I stopped because I had to take care of my children. I left them home
alone and [the Interahamwe] wanted me to train into the evening
hours . . .The kids had nobody to feed them, so I decided to be there for
my children.
Women who joined the Interahamwe placed themselves in a social and gender
stratum without precedent in Rwandan traditions. Burdened with ‘‘double duty,’’
women in the Interahamwe enjoyed neither the stature of full militia members, nor the
welcome of their former supportive communities. It follows that our respondent in the
militias reports feeling isolated from collective society, with few opportunities for
guidance. As a result of such isolation, women who deliberately killed fellow Rwandans
were not at all shielded from the resultant feelings of doubt, regret, or trauma.
Respondent 7: I always lived with guilt. I always thought about them. I asked myself
why I killed them, but didn’t find a reason, and regretted having done
it . . . I thought, ‘I ‘‘had no conflict with those people I killed, people with
whom I shared even water, and who always chatted with me. Why did I
kill them?’’ I started . . . looking for an elder who might have some
insight into these feelings, and how [the Interahamwe] had incited me
to become involved. But I found that even the elderly were afraid of
being killed, and they wouldn’t talk to me.
Summary
The results of this study reveal that for women, the decision to participate in the
Rwandan Genocide was motivated by a complex interaction between background
environmental themes that had been in play for years and contemporary experiential
pressures that gathered momentum in or around April 1994.
In brief, Rwandan women’s traditional environment of multiethnic, cohesive, and
inter-reliant communities was undermined repeatedly in the postcolonial years and
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faced its greatest challenges between 1990 and 1994, during the RPF invasion,
the implementation of multi-party politics, and the ascendancy of the Hutu Power
movement. However, communities remained essentially intact until the downing
of President Habyarimana’s plane on 6 April 1994, an act that the Rwandan
government blamed on the RPF in order to justify intensive militarization not only of
the armed forces but of civil society as well. From this point on, the Hutu Power
movement’s campaign to eliminate Tutsis and Hutu political opponents engulfed
virtually all social, interpersonal, and experiential aspects of the Rwandan reality,
and this situation prevailed until the end of the war in July 1994.
April 1994 marked the culmination of months of covert planning by extremists;
the reign of terror unleashed against Rwandan Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus
was well organized and pre-planned by Hutu Power leaders. In the interests of
‘‘national security,’’ civilians were called upon to murder Tutsi non-combatants, who
were characterized as enemy collaborators and as a threat to national security.
Average women experienced this as a true catastrophe and had the resultant reactions
of terror, despondency, and, for some, rage and calls for revenge against all Tutsis.
At the same time, women were terrified of the extremists who controlled national
governance and their local communities, fearing that they or their children would
be ensnared in the violence. Many aligned themselves with attack groups for
protection or in order to be less ‘‘visible’’ to the extremists, who were threatening
‘‘Tutsi sympathizers.’’ Others witnessed murders and were too fearful for their own
safety to intervene. Women, who were ordered to stay at home through the crisis, had
limited ability to gather information and thus to frame informed opinions about
the violence unleashed in their communities.
As a result of the limits drawn by gender, some women describe participating in the
genocide without substantial forethought and others describe their actions as
inadvertent. However, some Rwandan women admit to participating deliberately
and after considerable reflection. Such women believed the government propaganda
that all Tutsis were RPF collaborators and spies, plotting with the RPF to murder and
enslave Rwandan Hutus. For women not willing to breach traditional gender roles,
participation was more ‘‘passive,’’ including activities such as looting or denouncing
hidden victims. Other women, perhaps with a history of transgressing gender
boundaries in other aspects of community life, joined attack groups and actively
murdered victims.
Discussion
From these data a picture emerges of how the ‘‘perfect storm’’ of violence came to pass
and why the average Rwandan woman chose to become involved. The factors that were
most influential in motivating each individual to participate evolved with the shifting,
disturbing, and chaotic situation on the ground. Although there is no static case to
draw from, it is possible to derive an aerial overview of why women chose to participate
in the genocide and to understand the unique, gender-related experiences that
informed those choices.
This is the first study to investigate the attitudinal risks for extreme violence that
have the potential to be modified in public-health framework; as a result, there are few
studies in the literature for comparison. However, some parallels may be drawn
between our results and those from related fields of study.
Our finding regarding the sudden shift of women’s attitudes after the 6 April
1994 ‘‘disaster’’ is echoed in the literature on women in neo-Nazi groups in the
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United States. In her interviews with thirty-four female racist activists, Kathleen Blee
reports that for nearly all respondents, the ‘‘conversion’’ to racial activism was
prompted by ‘‘a single dramatic life event,’’47 such as a near-death experience or the
loss of a loved one. Conversion stories took on the quality of moving from ‘‘naivete´ to
enlightenment,’’48 much as Rwandan women rapidly aligned themselves with the
Hutu Power movement after the death of Habyarimana.
The situation of Rwandan women in 1994 also resembles the circumstances of
German women during the Third Reich. For example, far fewer women than men were
direct participants in killing during the Nazi Holocaust.49 Similarly, just as their
Rwandan counterparts a half-century later were admonished to stay indoors and take
care of home and family, German women under the Nazis were also encouraged by
official policy to confine their energies to Kinder, Ku¨che, Kirche (children, kitchen,
and church).50 Particularly after 1938, German women were charged with protecting a
peaceful, supportive space for soldiers engaged in emotionally upsetting activities at
the front.51 This concept reaffirms the themes conveyed by Respondents 7 and 8 in this
study, who were expected to manage home and children while at the same time
providing emotional support to husbands who spent their days ‘‘working’’ in attack
groups.
Other resemblances also become apparent. Like our study respondents, some
German women during the Third Reich refrained from forming political opinions,
while others were steadfast supporters of Nazi doctrine and policy.52 In addition,
Rwandan women’s predilection for property crimes during the 1994 genocide was a
reprise of German women’s behavior during the Holocaust. Highly positioned German
women—including Emmy Go¨ring, wife of Chancellor Hermann Go¨ring—engaged in
‘‘high-class’’ theft of the finest goods, homes, and lands expropriated from wealthy
victims, while even ‘‘average’’ women, such as members of the Bund Deutscher Ma¨del
(League of German Girls) willingly ejected Polish families from their farms, and looted
homesteads for the best equipment, during their campaign to ‘‘resettle’’ ethnic German
families from occupied territories.53
Both German and Rwandan women used genocide as an opportunity to step
outside of traditional constraints and enter the conventional workforce.54 For example,
the demands of rearmament and wartime economy called upon German women to take
on traditionally ‘‘male’’ jobs in increasing numbers after 1936; in 1944, fully 57% of all
German women were employed outside the home. Some wished to better their
circumstances or advance themselves professionally, while others wished to escape the
restraints imposed by more traditional roles. In Rwanda, too, a small number of
women (such as Pauline Nyiramasuhuko) used the genocide as an opportunity to
improve their financial circumstances or to advance ‘‘professionally’’ by assuming
positions of authority during the time of upheaval.
Finally, it appears that the experiences of Rwandan women who themselves were
part of the killing bureaucracy are also congruent with the experiences of German
women in similar positions. Although there are few recorded interviews with women in
the Schu¨tzstaffel (SS) available for comparison with Rwandan narratives, one example
is Anna Fest, who was conscripted into service as a Ravensbru¨ck guard in 1944 and
was interviewed in the early 1990s.55 The wife of a foot soldier on the Russian front,
Fest describes feeling helpless to refuse her given work assignment for fear of
damaging her husband’s standing and safety in the army.
Throughout extensive discussions, Fest continuously describes herself as naı¨ve, or
as having blinders on, for not wanting to see that although no women under her guard
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died while she worked at Ravensbru¨ck (a fact that appears to be historically accurate),
the conditions there were designed to slowly annihilate inmates.56 Only after Fest was
subjected to a 100-mile ‘‘death march’’ in 1945 did she come to see the goals of the Final
Solution as they really were and to rebel against them by assisting victims and publicly
accusing the SS officer in charge of murder. Fest’s commentary recalls the themes
inherent in the narrative of Respondent 9, a low-level Rwandan government official
(cellule leader) in 1994 who admits to having detained and guarded neighbors who
were rounded up and eventually killed by Interahamwe leaders from another part of
her city. Although Respondent 9 herself never harmed anyone personally, she turned
over her charges to the killers without protest, reportedly ‘‘not realizing’’ what would
happen to them once she did. After this incident, Respondent 9 reports, she felt
shocked and despondent. She spent the rest of the genocide hiding a group of targeted
children in her home; all of them went on to survive into adulthood.
Conclusion
As the international community (outside of a handful of courageous African nations)
fails to intervene in known episodes of genocide that continue at the time of this
writing,57 statesmen, academics, and human-rights workers have accelerated the
public debate on approaches to genocide prevention that might prove more effective in
current and future conflicts. However, this discussion has tended to conflate long-term
efforts toward primary prevention of genocide (what The Responsibility to Protect
calls studying and addressing the contributory root causes of catastrophic violence)
with emergency military, diplomatic, and economic ‘‘prevention’’ at the point when
large-scale atrocities have already begun (‘‘reaction to catastrophic violence,’’ in the
language of The Responsibility to Protect).58 This mixing of terminology has confused
the discussion of genocide prevention, to its detriment, and has focused the
international community on crises that are already out of control by the time adequate
attention is paid. Regrettably, late-phase approaches—although necessary—have not
been effective in preventing genocide in such countries as Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan,
and it is apparent that new strategies for the prevention of catastrophic violence are in
order. The introduction of sociological tools that predict societies at high risk for
catastrophic violence now makes it possible to target vulnerable societies years in
advance of an emergency.59 The science of public health is uniquely situated to enter
this discussion with synergistic, longer-range, primary approaches to violence
prevention that have proved durable over the past twenty years.
The objective of the ARC-G agenda is to identify attitudinal patterns among
potential genocide perpetrators that may be amenable to modification, years in
advance of provocations by genocidal governments. The data presented here
demonstrate that it is possible, in a retrospective sample of genocide perpetrators, to
ascertain the attitudes and beliefs that drive average citizens to tacitly support,
actively encourage, or thoroughly involve themselves in genocidal violence. In the
immediate next steps of the ARC-G agenda, researchers will attempt to ascertain,
through similar methods in real time, the attitudes and beliefs that drive individuals
who are currently involved in episodes of extreme violence.
However, no effort of primary genocide prevention, no matter how long-range,
can be successful without targeting women and girls, as well as men and boys, in
well-researched programs of attitudinal change. The fact that women and girls suffer
the highest casualties during episodes of collective armed conflict has been
demonstrated by a growing body of recent scholarship.60 In spite of this, the critical
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role of women in supporting, promoting, and perpetrating episodes of collective
violence must not be overlooked. Women create nurturing environments for husbands,
sons, and brothers to rejuvenate from the trauma of mass killing and, in so doing,
may be seen as complicit in this crime.61 Women cheer on killers from the sidelines.
Women are likely to be the main perpetrators of property crimes against targeted
victims across genocidal outbreaks. Ultimately, a small percentage of women have
participated in hands-on assault and murder in all documented instances of
genocide.62
The societal pressures that drive women and girls to participate in genocide are
by no means identical to those that drive men and boys within the same society.63
Health-education campaigns targeting violence prevention will succeed in proportion
to how well the pressures pushing each segment of the population are understood
and how carefully health messages are crafted to reach each individual sector of
the community. It is not difficult to imagine crafting long-range educational programs
targeting female as well asmale civilians in order to engender attitudes and behaviors
that are resistant to provocation by genocidal governments when disaster strikes.
Along similar lines, it is also possible to envision crafting media broadcasts targeted
specifically at relatively homebound women during times of national catastrophe,
in order to supply them with accessible information, balanced reportage, and
strategies for successful resistance to the pressure to engage in human-right abuses
and crimes.
The data on women’s tendency toward more ‘‘gender-consonant’’ crimes such as
looting or denouncement have not been explored fully with respect to genocide but
have been the subject of extensive research in other settings where women commit
crimes. This may prove a promising avenue of research, in that there is a substantial
body of literature to draw on for future genocide-prevention initiatives targeted at
the very much neglected population of young and older women who are drawn into
all aspects of extreme population-based violence.
Finally, it is important to add that the approaches put forward by the ARC-G
research agenda are designed to be synergistic with other later-phase military,
diplomatic, and economic approaches to genocide prevention and cessation. The
necessary and sufficient structural conditions that predispose societies to outbreaks
of catastrophic violence have been discussed elsewhere64 and will be repeated
here only to point out that, from the broadest perspective, genocide is considered a
crime of governments against their citizens. However, while non-democratic govern-
ments may incite their populations to attack unarmed civilians, and specific social
conditions may exacerbate the inclination of groups to lash out, it is self-evident that,
in any genocide, individuals support and carry out the actual killing. The conclusion
may be drawn that any organized, scientific approach to genocide prevention will
be incomplete without a long-range strategy for transforming genocide predictors
in individuals and groups on the ground.
The data reported here represent a preliminary step in developing a more complete
understanding of the roles that young and older women play in catastrophic violence,
as well as in defining what a public-health-based approach to long-range, primary
genocide prevention might look like. The object of future inquiry will be to test whether
it is possible to apply this approach in incipient conflict zones and whether
implementation of health-education campaigns, developed from similar data in
a contemporary setting, will have the desired effect of lowering rates of violence in
high-risk jurisdictions.
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Interethnic Marriages, the Survival
of Women, and the Logics of Genocide
in Rwanda
Anuradha Chakravarty
Department of Government, Cornell University
This article focuses on the gendered dimensions of the genocide in Rwanda. It seeks
to explain why Tutsi women married to Hutu men appeared to have better chances
of survival than Tutsi women married to Tutsi men or even Hutu women married
to Tutsi men. Based on data from a field site in southwest Rwanda, the findings
and insights offered here draw on the gendered, racial, and operational dynamics
of the genocide as it unfolded between April and July 1994.
Introduction
In September 1992, a military commission report in Rwanda officially defined the
‘‘main enemy’’ as ‘‘Tutsis from inside or outside the country’’ and the ‘‘secondary
enemy’’ as ‘‘anyone providing any kind of assistance to the main enemy.’’1 Since the
invasion of Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels in 1990, extremist propaganda
had focused on the immutable racial distinction between Hutu and Tutsi. The Tutsis
were denounced as historic ‘‘invaders’’ who had ‘‘stolen the country.’’ The RPF
attack was cast as a similar attempt, undertaken with the help of Tutsis within
Rwanda, all of whom were, by an extension of this racial logic, pronounced accomplices
of the rebels.2
Despite this undifferentiated notion of ‘‘main enemy,’’ not all Tutsis in a given area
were targeted at the same time, or in similar ways, when the genocide began on
the night of 6 April 1994.3 By the end of April, about half the Tutsi population had
been killed,4 and Tutsi men and boys had been the primary targets.5 Several thousand
Tutsi women and girls were killed in the first month of genocide, but it was from mid-
May onward that there was a significant rise in Tutsi female deaths. According to
Alison Des Forges, it was likely that a ‘‘decision to kill women had been made at
the national level and was being implemented in local communities.’’6 By the
time genocide was halted in mid-July, between 75 and 80% of the approximately
850,000 dead7 were male.8 For this reason, Rwanda is sometimes referred to as the
land of widows.9
There is a paucity of focused theoretical work or empirical research on the
gendered dimensions of genocide in Rwanda. As a rule, scholarship on the genocide has
focused on its multiple causes, evaluating the role of ethnic hatred and racial ideology
vis-a`-vis the role of fear, pressure, opportunism, and poverty; on the role of
international actors; on the mechanisms and patterns of local participation; and on
the diffusion of violence over time and space.10 Valuable information exists, however,
in detailed reports prepared by human-rights organizations on sexual violence
perpetrated against mainly Tutsi but also Hutu women, on the varied roles that
women played as perpetrators of violence, and on estimates of the scale of rape, forced
pregnancies, and the spread of HIV/AIDS.11
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Survivor testimonies and eyewitness accounts in the available literature
suggest that while Tutsi women were not the primary targets in the early stages
of the massacres, they were not treated in an undifferentiated manner. That is, Tutsi
women married to Hutu men appear to have been targeted later than Tutsi women
married to Tutsi men. It also appears that Tutsi women with Hutu husbands escaped
death, rape, or mutilation more often than Tutsi women with Tutsi husbands.
The paucity of large-scale systematic evidence, however, prohibits us from making
conclusive or generalizable arguments from these observations.
Although the scope of this article is limited, in that the validity of these
observations in a single research site cannot conclusively confirm that they hold true
in a general sense across the country, a self-selection problem does not exist: Masaka
sector in southwest Rwanda12 was chosen as a research site for entirely different
reasons, such as proximity to a main highway and a local gacaca tribunal for genocide
crimes that worked without frequent interruptions and down time. Both of these were
important factors, because I was interested in investigating how knowledge about
the genocide was produced at the local level through the operation of gacaca’s
judicial process, while the relative accessibility of Masaka sector made repeat visits
and long-terms stays in the area possible. It was later that I discovered that Tutsi
women married to Hutu men in Masaka sector had been more likely to survive
genocide than Tutsi women married to Tutsi men.
It is worth noting that genocide was carried out at the local level with the
widespread participation of local actors. Therefore, an intensive local-level investiga-
tion remains pertinent. This article goes beyond qualitative analysis and ethnographic
empiricism to propose a theoretical explanation drawing on intersections of the
gendered, racial, and operational logics of genocide in Rwanda.
In Masaka sector, of the twelve Tutsi female survivors who were adults in 1994,
ten had been married to Hutu husbands. The other two had Tutsi husbands who were
killed. Of all other mono-ethnic Tutsi marriages, both partners perished.
Approximately seventeen Hutu women had been married to Tutsi men in 1994.
With one exception, all of the Tutsi husbands were killed.
At least three Tutsi men who were adults in 1994 survived the genocide in Masaka.
Of these, one was an elderly man (married to a Hutu woman) who later died of natural
causes, and the two others migrated out of the sector for work. During the period of
field research, there were no adult Tutsi men living in the sector. About ten Tutsi
children survived in 1994. Of these survivors who were not adults in 1994, the majority
are female. Except for one young man who now lives elsewhere, the others are now
young adolescents or in their late teens. Since ethnicity passes down the male line in
Rwanda, all of them had Tutsi fathers. But none of their fathers survived the
genocide.13
I spent several months in Masaka sector, living with ordinary residents and
participating in everyday life. The data for this article are drawn from in-depth
interviews with a representative sample of the population and from transcripts of
eight complete trials for genocide crimes observed at the local gacaca tribunal.14
The accounts given here are reconstructions of events such as the genocide in
Masaka—the data were gathered from different sources and verified for accuracy by
means of cross-checking against other available information. In certain places, the
narratives of respondents are reproduced in their own words. Because of space
constraints, other accounts have been condensed and narrated in the third person to
highlight those details that are relevant for this analysis.
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A Three-Pronged Explanation
Any satisfactory explanation has to go beyond blanket theses such as ethnic hatred
and genocide ideology, because these cannot account for variation in the way Tutsis
were targeted or explain why all Hutus did not participate in the killings.15 In the
following subsection, gendered practices of nationalist or identity-based violence are
examined in order to explain why Tutsi men were primarily targeted in the initial
stages and why it was so difficult for Tutsi males of all ages to survive. The next
subsection shows how gendered constructions of the ethnic ‘‘other’’ help to explain why
Tutsi women were allowed to survive in much higher numbers than male Tutsis. This,
however, does not explain why Tutsi women with Hutu husbands were relatively safe
from physical harm compared to Tutsi women married to Tutsi men. The succeeding
subsection argues that the operational dynamics of genocide at the local level offer a
plausible explanation. The last two subsections explore how this intersection of racial,
gendered, and operational logics of genocide explains the experiences of Hutu women
in interethnic and mono-ethnic marriages.
Targeting Tutsi Men
Adam Jones has argued that mass killing of men has been a ‘‘definitional feature’’ of
genocide and often a ‘‘prelude to the ‘root and branch’ extermination’’ of a
community.16 The reasons for targeting the male population might be the strategic
need to destroy battle-age male non-combatants capable of joining the ranks of enemy
soldiers or to eliminate social elites capable of mobilizing resistance (church leaders,
opinion leaders, and politicians being predominantly male in general). The use of
sexual violence against men makes it possible to inflict humiliation by feminizing the
ethnic ‘‘other’’17; the physical extermination of men can be used, in combination with
other methods, to prevent a community from perpetuating itself.
It is not difficult to find confirming evidence in the case of Rwanda. In the
numerous small-scale massacres of Tutsis during the years of civil war preceding
the genocide, Tutsi men were almost exclusively targeted as potential members of
the RPF.18 Besides killing Tutsi men during the genocide, the perpetrators also
castrated Tutsi male children, sometimes forced adult Tutsi men to have sex with
known HIV-positive women,19 and spared neither the very old nor the very young.20
Because Tutsi men were rarely spared, they were not in a position (in reality, not alive)
to cajole or bargain with perpetrators for the lives of their Tutsi wives or children.
Targeting Tutsi Women: Gendered Constructions of the ‘‘Other’’
The racialization of identity in Rwanda can be traced to the early twentieth century.
Colonial authorities interpreted pre-existing social inequalities in light of the Hamitic
hypothesis (the idea that Tutsis were racially similar to the Europeans and,
thus, allegedly superior to the Negroid Hutu in physiology, intellect, and innate
abilities). Following this logic, the Belgians introduced a race-based census and ethnic
identification cards. Hitherto salient markers of identity such as lineage, clan, and
dialect were gradually subsumed under a racial understanding of social difference,21
and, in the pre-independence era, both Hutu and Tutsi elites appropriated those
elements of the Hamitic hypothesis that best suited their interests.22 The Bahutu
Manifesto, which foreshadowed the establishment of the First Hutu Republic,
pointedly stated that the social problem was the racial problem and should be
understood as the political, economic, and cultural domination of the Tutsi race.
From 1990 onward, the extremist media popularized the same logic, harping on the
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‘‘origins of the criminality of Tutsi’’23 and calling on ‘‘all Hutu to reinforce their
unity.’’24
Decades of institutionalized racism had produced mental maps of racial difference,
concomitant with myths about origins, stereotypes about the ‘‘nature of the Tutsi’’
and the ‘‘nature of the Hutu,’’25 and imputation of a historic agenda of conquest by
Tutsi as a race. The extremist media—Radio-Te´le´vision Libre des Milles Collines
(RTLM) and the magazine Kangura—represented the Tutsi as an ambitious, ruthless,
and tricky race. Tutsi women in particular were portrayed in an array of forms.
Historically perceived as women of the royal courts or the upper classes, they were cast
as exotic sexual objects beyond the reach of the ordinary Hutu. If a Tutsi woman
deigned to marry a Hutu man, it was said to be a conspiracy of her male co-ethnics to
use her feminine charms to trick Hutu men. During the genocide, Hutu males were
targeted for propaganda and innuendo suggesting that they could now enjoy these
exotic and arrogant Tutsi women, provided they were perpetually on guard against
their treacherous nature. It is interesting that there were no specific orders for rape,
nor were lists compiled of those to be raped (unlike the lists that were drawn up of
those marked for death); nevertheless, innuendo, jokes, and propaganda were
interpreted as intended.26
It was standard practice for female Tutsis to be allowed to live and be abused as sex
slaves, either by force or by a mutual compact that traded sexual services for survival.
It is also true, though, that thousands of female Tutsis were raped before being
killed. The word kubohoza (‘‘to liberate’’) was used for the act of rape. This word had
been used in the context of the launch of multi-party politics in 1991 that marked
the end of President Juve´nal Habyarimana’s single-party dictatorship of the National
Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) party. At that time
it referred to a violent campaign by the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR)
party that forced MRND officials to switch their political affiliation to the MDR.27
It was also associated with the coercive appropriation of land and resources and
reflected a tendency to use violence in the pursuit of political ends. The use of the same
word for rape indicates that sexual violence and forcible impregnation were
consciously associated with politics and the extremist Hutu Power agenda.28 (Here it
is worth noting that feminist scholars have shown how rape and impregnation
of enemy women is part of war and an attempt at ethnic cleansing.29 In the
former Yugoslavia, for example, raped women were kept in custody until they could no
longer abort, and similar stories spread in both Serbia and Croatia about how ‘‘‘others’
had raped ‘our’ women, and wanted to spoil our nation.’’30)
Tutsi Women in Interethnic Marriages
To argue that Hutu men were not targeted and were therefore able to protect their
Tutsi wives would be to obscure the complex reality of genocide. Many ordinary Hutus
were specifically singled out for violence, including old enemies of locally powerful
ge´nocidaires, social deviants such as thieves and sorcerers,31 and sometimes the rich.
Hutu men married to Tutsi women were also vulnerable targets because of the social
construction of female Tutsis as spies for their male co-ethnics. The first of the
‘‘Hutu Ten Commandments’’ printed in the extremist magazine Kangura announced
that any Hutu man who had a Tutsi female as wife, mistress, secretary, or even friend
would be considered a traitor.32 As a result, a Tutsi wife could become a source of
embarrassment, if not a deadly liability, for a Hutu man among his co-ethnics and
the focal point for considerable pressure from Hutu family members who felt
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unsafe harboring an icyitso (‘‘accomplice’’). In fact, many Hutu husbands abandoned
their Tutsi wives or handed them over to their killers without protest. Tellingly,
in Nazi Germany in the 1930s, Christian husbands were similarly pressured to divorce
Jewish wives and divorce cases were on the rise.33
Although interethnic marriages had traditionally been a way of cementing ties
and building relationships based on mutual exchange between Hutu and Tutsi
families, the institution was subject to intense scrutiny in the genocidal propaganda.
Radical nationalist projects derive legitimacy from focusing on questions of racial
purity, origin, and genealogy, where blood and semen are the pure fluids that transmit
racial belonging, moral purity, and spiritual integrity; if contaminated, they are
believed to transmit disease and decay.34 The fear of interethnic marriages stemmed
from concerns about destruction of the nation through the racially impure progeny
of mixed couples. There was also paranoia about the danger posed by an ‘‘elusive
enemy’’ who could not be identified, despite being among them, because the differences
were supposedly biological and ‘‘hidden’’—not cultural, linguistic, or even physiological
in any obvious fashion.35 Warnings such as ‘‘Tutsi, don’t try to hide yourselves’’
appeared in issues of Kangura as early as the winter of 1990/1991, referring to Tutsis
figuratively as hiding behind their Hutu spouses but also directed metaphorically at
ibiymanyi (those of mixed parentage).36
All Hutu men in mixed marriages could not save their Tutsi wives, but those
able to do so were successful, in large part, because of the operational logic of genocide
at ground level. Recent research has shown how ordinary people in Rwanda were
mobilized by local networks of family, friends, and peers to join groups of attackers
through a mix of coercion and persuasion.37 The mobs were large, the most common
size of a group ranging between eleven and thirty people.38 In Masaka sector, there
was a smaller core group whose members split up and mobilized larger groups
for different attacks.
From my interviews with Hutu men who were able to save their Tutsi wives from
rape or death, what stands out prominently is the fact that they were acquainted with
one or more of the people at the center of the attack. This allowed them to negotiate
and strike a bargain with the mob, usually involving the exchange of a cow or other
livestock or property for the life of the woman. Even if the Hutu husband did not
recognize anyone in the mob, a bargain was possible if a friend or neighbor who rallied
around the besieged family happened to know one or more of the key actors among the
attackers and stepped in to mediate.
The lives of Tutsi men were rarely spared. Thus, in mono-ethnic Tutsi marriages,
the Tutsi husband was not in a position either to save himself or to protect his wife.
In Masaka, the usual practice was for the death squads to grab the family’s livestock;
steal bricks, tiles, and furniture from the house; and kill the couple and the children
after ascertaining that there were no further assets that had been hidden away.
Families split up and went into hiding, each member on his or her own, to maximize
chances of survival. If someone was discovered, attackers coerced information about
the location of the livestock and other property owned by the family—and then, having
verified that the things were truly where he or she said they were, killed the victim.39
In contrast, a deal between Hutu men with Tutsi wives and Hutu perpetrators
was still possible, particularly if three conditions were fulfilled: first, one or more of the
key actors in the mob happened to be acquainted with the Hutu husband or with
someone who supported the husband’s position; second, the Hutu husband was on
the spot when the attack occurred; and, third, he was willing to take risks. It must
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be understood that each argument with an armed and hostile mob constituted a risk,
and each insistent plea for reconsideration meant that the Hutu husband was courting
danger and risked being physically assaulted, if not killed.
Still other elements went into making such a compact between Hutu men durable.
If the Hutu protector happened to be a man who was well respected or well liked in
the community, the bargain was sealed with the attackers’ promise, on their word
of honor, that they would not renege on the deal. The situation changed dramatically if
a Hutu man hid his Tutsi wife in the bush, or in someone else’s home, and she
happened to be discovered. It was unlikely that her Hutu hosts would risk the ire of
the mob by attempting to negotiate or resist. If the hosts did not personally know
anyone involved in the attack, there was also little possibility of bargaining to spare
the woman’s life. In the event that the hosts did resist, they were usually threatened
and sometimes beaten up. If the Tutsi woman was found hiding alone in the bush,
she could be raped or killed immediately.
Hutu Women in Interethnic Marriages
The above account provides evidence that Tutsi men could not protect themselves,
as they were denied a chance to bargain for their lives. Neither could Hutu wives
of Tutsi men do much to protect their husbands, because there were no readily
available templates for such social roles of women as negotiating partners with men.
Rwandan men expected their women to be hardworking and submissive, and women
traditionally had little access to education, jobs, or inheritance or ownership rights
to property.40 In Masaka, not only were the Tutsi husbands and children killed,
their houses were also destroyed and property looted.
Hutu women in interethnic marriages were also perceived as traitors and were
often raped or beaten up as punishment by male co-ethnics. Nationalist projects
depend on maintaining the boundaries of ‘‘their’’ nation. This requires constant
policing and tight control of women’s sexuality, marriage, and reproduction—whether
in Rwanda, in the former Yugoslavia, or in Nazi Germany.41 Serb and Croat women
in mixed marriages bore the brunt of Serb and Croat nationalisms, respectively:
Serb women married to Croat men suffered insults thrown at them by ethnic Serbs,
such as ‘‘Croatian prostitutes’’ or ‘‘Ustasˇa mothers’’; Croat women married to Serb men
were called such names as ‘‘Serbian prostitutes’’ and ‘‘Cˇetnik mothers’’ by ethnic
Croatians.42 In Nazi Germany, non-Jewish women guilty of ‘‘racial misconduct’’ under
the Nuremberg Laws were photographed and their names and addresses publicly
displayed. Because male Jews were portrayed as sexual predators in Nazi discourse,
most cases dealing with ‘‘race defilement’’ laws involved Jewish men and non-Jewish
women.43
Hutu Women in Mono-ethnic Marriages
Like every other social actor, Hutu women with Hutu husbands largely failed to
extend support or comfort to Tutsi women faced with grave danger. Recent advances in
feminist theory alert us to the risks of simplistic and essentialized notions of
‘‘sisterhood’’ and ‘‘women’s solidarity’’ across ethnic and class divides. On the one hand,
there are often real ideological or political differences between identity-based groups or
class formations, and the real question for women may well be how they can bridge
these differences without denying them. On the other hand, women may be too
invested or rooted in these positions to shift or move across the chasm to locate
common interests and build on them.44
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Feminist analyses show how women are both mobilized and oppressed by their
‘‘own’’ nationalist movements, which glorify traditional gender codes and male
power.45 Jean Bethke Elshtain argues that by slipping into idealized roles such as
the ‘‘spartan mother’’ or the ‘‘beautiful soul,’’ women have ‘‘more often than not’’
exhorted their men to violence in the national interest and honored them for their
actions.46 Expected to be patriotic and comforting wives, German Christian women
provided a soothing family environment for their men to come home to from their jobs
in the concentration camps and did not confront them with questions about the war,
the Jews, or politics in general—even when they heard rumors or knew from different
sources about what was going on.47 In Rwanda, the extremist magazine Kangura
conferred upon Hutu women the dubious distinction of being ‘‘more suitable and more
conscientious in their roles as woman, spouse and mother’’ and urged them to wean
Hutu men away from the charms of Tutsi women.48 The emotional insecurity and envy
this induced may have prevented Hutu women from feeling more sympathetic
toward the plight of Tutsi women. In fact, many Hutu women played an active part in
the genocide. They refused refuge to Tutsis in need, betrayed those hidden in their
homes, acted as informants, and also killed. As loyal Hutus, some prominent
Hutu women donned military fatigues and organized the massacres in their areas.49
The example of Masaka sector cautions against over-generalization in any direction.
Sometimes polygamous Hutu men hid the Tutsi wife in the home of the Hutu wife.
Perhaps these women were motivated by genuine sympathy for the plight of the
Tutsi wives, or perhaps they did not want to incur their husband’s displeasure and
submitted to his wish that they extend refuge. In Masaka, at any rate, among the
surviving Tutsi women married to Hutu men, it was rare to encounter a case where
they attributed their survival primarily to being hidden in the Hutu wife’s home.
Genocide in Masaka Sector
There is little evidence that all perpetrators were motivated by a genocidal impulse,
but it would be problematic to underestimate the extent of fear and paranoia
that ordinary Hutu felt toward the ethnic ‘‘other’’ as a whole in the context of the
RPF invasion and the unflagging hysteria broadcast over the RTLM. Tutsi residents of
Masaka were suspected of secretly harboring sympathy for the rebels. A few Tutsi
individuals were singled out, and rumors began to circulate about their allegedly
active support for the military effort of the RPF. One of them, John, had become
the object of much speculation. During my interviews, many respondents mentioned
that people used to say that John hated Hutus. Many had apparently believed
that documents proving his support to the rebels had been found and that John was
expecting to be rewarded with political office after the RPF victory.
With the introduction of multi-party politics in 1991, various political parties had
organized meetings in Biryogo, a trading center an hour’s journey by foot from
Masaka. The MDR party had enjoyed a popular resurgence in this area because of its
status as the party of the founding father of the first Hutu Republic and its association
with the Hutu of the south. Some young men from Masaka had been sent to a
neighboring district for military training. Respondents said they discovered only later
that these people had been trained as Interahamwe, the feared youth militia.50
Most people clearly recalled an incident they identified as the first act of genocide
in the area. The night of 6 April had been a tense one for the community. They had
heard of the assassination of President Habyarimana on the radio, and the newscast
The Logics of Genocide in Rwanda
241
had held the RPF responsible. In the early hours of 7 April, a Tutsi businessman who
lived in Biryogo was killed.
That morning some people came to our sector from Biryogo saying that Michel had
been killed. They were looking for John because they said he was helping the
Inkotanyi.51 We had been sitting in Alex’s bar at the gasantere. They informed us that
people were taking beans, sugar, and other things from Michel’s shop and many people
from here went to see what they could take.52
The gasantere came up as a recurrent motif in peoples’ narratives in the interviews
and also in their testimonies at the gacaca tribunal. Gasantere are spaces at the
heart of community life at the grassroots level.53 Within the gasantere there are bars
serving alcohol and meat, small shops, and a weekly market attracting local farmers
and sellers from the nearest trading center. These centers became places where local
strongmen orchestrating the killings met with ordinary perpetrators. Some meetings
were restricted to an inner circle, whose members were well known in Masaka for their
high visibility during the genocide and their leadership of mob attacks at multiple
sites in the sector. Other meetings were open to the public, and people would drift
in and out.
Information was pooled about the number of Tutsis killed and how many
remained. People vied for the leaders’ attention and provided information about
possible hiding places of fugitives. The leaders divided those who gathered around
them (in bars and other meeting places) into groups and sent them on specific
missions.54 Sometimes a mob from another sector would venture into Masaka, merge
with the local groups if they happened to meet on the hills, and go on an attack
together.55 In the evening, stolen cows or goats would be slaughtered and the
gasantere became sites for feasting and swapping stories about the day’s events.
On the aforementioned day, news about Michel’s death had spread quickly as people
returned home with the looted items.
It was Thursday. Around noon, the old woman came to my house. She said, ‘‘my child,
our time has come’’ . . .They hid in the sorghum fields that night.56
‘‘The old woman’’ referred to was an elderly Tutsi woman who had a Tutsi husband
and a large family. The family lived near the interviewee. Except for one daughter,
Odette, everybody had gone to hide in the bush that night. Odette’s mutilated body,
with her breasts cut off, was discovered the next morning:
I had heard loud noises and people were shouting as they went by on this road but it
was dark. I did not know who they were. The family returned the next morning and
they called us after finding her body. Some of us helped to bury her.57
Christopher Taylor has argued that techniques of cruelty derived from a meaningful
‘‘mythic logic’’ in which Tutsi were thought of as a harmful ‘‘blockage’’ requiring
excision from the body politic to restore the nation to health. The racial logic had been
organically mapped onto concepts of sickness (blockage) and health (restoration of
flow) in traditional medicine. Victims were thrown into rivers, as if to represent the
flowing out of impurity, and the dead were piled up in pit latrines as if the nation had
relieved itself of bodily wastes. Breast oblation of Tutsi women and castration of Tutsi
men symbolically represented attempts to ‘‘block’’ the flow of bodily fluids necessary to
reproduce and sustain life.58
For the vast majority of people in Masaka, it was several days before they realized
that Tutsi were the intended targets. Initially, both Hutu and Tutsi had been afraid of
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spending nights at home and went to hide in the fields. The morning of 8 April was
described as follows:
There had been attacks during the night in other cells also but nobody was killed
there . . .We saw that only homes of Tutsi were burning . . .Our cows had been stolen.
Next morning, I got information about who had taken our cows. We went there and got
many of our cows back.59
Neither was there much awareness, in those first few days, that the violence had
been set in motion by government leaders at the highest level and that government
offices were not going to be sanctuaries for the Tutsi. Tutsis who managed to survive
the roadblocks and get to the district office were killed there.60
We had gone to inform the conseiller about Odette’s death, but he was having many
problems dealing with the situation. The homes of his neighbors were burning. He told
us to go to the district to get help.61
Many Tutsis had died in Masaka by the time the weekend was over. Mono-ethnic
Tutsi families had been targeted first. As mentioned above, families often split up to
maximize their chances of survival and went into hiding separately. Those who were
found were killed. Interethnic couples in which the husband was Tutsi were also
attacked, and the husband and Tutsi children were killed. Tutsi wives of Hutu
husbands were hunted last.
Many Hutu respondents said that they understood after this that ‘‘Tutsi had been
given up to be killed,’’ meaning not so much that the government had ordered the
killings but that the government would do nothing to step in and prevent Tutsis
from being killed. They did not deny the involvement of local residents but blamed
unemployed youth and soldiers from ‘‘elsewhere,’’ as well as death squads from
neighboring sectors, for the actual killings. However, based on information pieced
together from trial testimonies at the gacaca proceedings, it appears that the initial
attacks were orchestrated by core groups that were highly mobile and were trained
and equipped for killing. These key actors successfully activated their local networks,
attracted a mass following by providing ample opportunities for plunder, and coerced
the unwilling. There was often overlapping membership across various groups.
But when they went on attacks together, peer pressure and common experiences
of brutality forged a similar mindset and a certain loyalty to the squad. For instance,
the vocabularies of participants in the attacks reveal the use of hunting metaphors
to refer to search-and-kill operations.62
Stories of Survival
In this section, the experiences of two Tutsi women married to Hutu men will be
discussed. Jill did not survive the genocide, and the account of her death contrasts
sharply with the story of Chantal’s narrow escape.
Chantal had worked out a routine. She would hide in the bush during the day
and slip back, under cover of darkness, to spend the night at home with her husband,
Paul, and their children. One night they heard the shouts of an approaching mob.
Paul urged Chantal to slip away through the back door and hide in the sorghum fields.
The stalks of sorghum were several feet tall and provided reasonably good cover in the
dark. The attackers demanded that Chantal be turned over to them, but Paul
responded that she had run away weeks ago and was probably dead by now. They
refused to believe the story and searched the entire house. They held machetes at
the throats of the children and threatened to kill them if Paul did not tell them
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about Chantal’s whereabouts. Among those leading the attack were a few people
that Paul knew well; he had often shared drinks with them and visited their homes
in the past. These people insisted they had a reliable tip that Chantal was
alive and was being hidden by her husband. Paul began to bargain for a settlement
at this point.
Roused by the shouts and the cries, a Hutu neighbor came up to the house and
supported Paul’s plea that the mob take the only cow the family owned and spare
Chantal’s life. This neighbor also knew the leaders of the group. It came out during
the gacaca trials that he had participated in other attacks with these very same
people, and that was how he knew them—but at the time, it was fortunate for Paul
that the neighbor stepped up to bargain on his behalf with the mob. The two men
demanded a guarantee that the mob would not renege on their agreement and return
to kill Chantal later. The leaders pledged in writing that because Paul had ‘‘only one
person who was Tutsi—the wife,’’ and because this ‘‘Tutsi bears children who are
Hutu,’’63 they would not attack his house. They also promised on their word of honor to
prevent other groups from targeting the couple.
Jill was not so fortunate. Her husband had hidden her in the home of his trusted
Hutu friends in another cell. She had been hiding in the space between the roof and
a room’s ceiling with her child for several weeks. The first group that attacked the
home of her elderly Hutu hosts said that they had been informed about an icyitso
(accomplice) hiding there, but they did not discover her up in the roof space. The Hutu
hosts said they suspected that one of Jill’s neighbors had seen her at their home and
tipped off the attackers. Jill and her child were discovered during the second search
of the house a few days later.
Jill’s husband used to scout around the area looking out for attackers. It is not
clear whether someone had identified him; some of the attackers discovered him and
hit him with the blunt edge of a machete. The bulk of that mob came from a
neighboring sector, and neither Jill’s husband nor the Hutu hosts knew the leaders
of the attack. The child ran to the father, and the two escaped. Jill was killed
immediately in the front yard, and her hosts buried her nearby. Some attackers
pursued the father and child but could not find them. The child remained with an old
Hutu woman until July.
The chances of escaping rape or death shrank dramatically if the intended victims
were discovered and did not have a Hutu protector present who not only had some
degree of familiarity with the leaders of the mob but was also willing to take some
personal risks in the victims’ defense. Tutsi women were saved when their
Hutu husbands were tipped off about impending attacks by reliable friends who
were in cahoots with other perpetrators or when Hutu husbands were able to procure
Hutu identity cards through powerful contacts in the area or to negotiate a deal
that might preserve the lives not only of their Tutsi wives but also of other Tutsi
relatives for at least another day.
When all other inducements failed, the argument remained that Tutsi women
married to Hutu men gave birth to Hutu children. Early in the genocide, an elderly
Hutu man saved the lives of two young nieces, daughters of his Hutu sister who
had married a Tutsi man. The husband had been killed, but the old man intervened
and argued that the lives of the girls should be spared because they would grow up to
be the wives of Hutu men. The leader of this mob was related to the old man.
Unconvinced that the disheveled children were indeed girls, the attackers demanded
that they strip so they could be sure the argument was reasonable. As the naked
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children cowered on the floor in a kneeling position, the old man argued and reasoned
until the attackers finally left. He then dug a deep trench in his banana plantation,
where he hid and fed the girls until the genocide came to an end three months later.
Concluding Notes
This article has tried to cover considerable ground using a three-pronged explanation
drawing on the racial, gendered, and operational dynamics of genocide in Rwanda.
There is a great need to focus on the experiences of victims, survivors, and perpetrators
as gendered actors. People depended on each other for survival in complicated ways—
the specifics of the situation when faced with a death squad, prior relationships
and mutual understandings among Hutu and between Hutu and Tutsi during
such interactions—and each situation was always mediated by gender considerations.
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The UK Government and the 1994
Genocide in Rwanda
Linda Melvern
‘‘I can think of no more irresponsible act of a British government in modern times . . .’’
—Geoffrey Robertson, QC1
The genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994 will remain, for our generation,
the enduring failure to intervene in the face of massive human-rights abuse.
The genocide lasted for three months, and during that time an estimated one million
people were killed. The killing was organized in advance; it was the direct result
of a deliberate government policy and was carried out according to an explicit strategy.
The combination of revelations about the scale and the intensity of the genocide,
the failure to intervene to prevent it or to stop its progression country-wide, and the
suppression of information about what was actually happening is a shocking
indictment not just of the UN Security Council but of governments and individuals
who knew what was happening and who chose to remain silent. The failure of
UN policy toward Rwanda, a policy devised by members of the Security Council, had a
decisive effect on events. It merits precise documentation.
The focus of this article is the role of the British government led by Prime Minister
John Major. While the United Nations has shown its willingness to uncover how and
why it reacted the way it did,2 in the United Kingdom there continues to be a
reluctance to try to account for Britain’s policies toward Rwanda. Neither press nor
Parliament has shown any enthusiasm to scrutinize this particular part of history or
to explain why the United Kingdom, a country with a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council, should have chosen to influence events in the way it did.3 Britain,
far from taking a back seat, was instrumental in shaping the UN response to the
crisis,4 and this leaves unanswered a central question: Was the United Kingdom,
a country with special power and privilege in the Security Council, impotent
or unwilling to implement the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG),5 either to prevent the occurrence of
genocide in Rwanda or, once it began, to stop it from spreading?
In the United Kingdom, a country where secrecy pervades most aspects of
government, the issue of Rwanda is particularly sensitive. There are continuing
attempts to obscure individual responsibility in the decision-making process. There is
even a claim that, in the archives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in
Whitehall, the paper trail on Rwanda, 1990–1994, has been weeded.6 There is
resistance to release any of the diplomatic cables that passed between the policy
makers in London and Britain’s UN mission in New York. Some officials involved
at the time are reluctant even to discuss Rwanda, a reluctance bolstered by the
ongoing failure of press and Parliament to examine this episode in British foreign
policy. In the writings and memoirs of those concerned, there is hardly a relevant
word—in John Major’s case, the genocide has completely vanished from the public
version of his period in office.7
Linda Melvern, ‘‘The UK Government and the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,’’ Genocide Studies
and Prevention 2, 3 (November 2007): 249–258. ! 2007 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
doi: 10.3138/gs.2.3.249
When I first began to query government policy toward Rwanda, I was given
various reasons for the inaction. I was told that the FCO and the then foreign
secretary, Douglas Hurd, did not know what was happening in Rwanda. ‘‘We had
absolutely no sources of information,’’ our UN ambassador, David Hannay, told me.8
‘‘The genocide came like a bolt from the blue,’’ another insider claimed. There was no
British embassy in Rwanda, which was considered to be in the ‘‘francophone sphere’’
of Africa; the government had simply believed what the French were saying.9
Alternatively, it was claimed that British policy makers were given inadequate
briefings by UN officials in the Security Council and that this had made the
United Kingdom ‘‘look in the wrong direction.’’ There were several claims that the
United Kingdom had simply gone along with ‘‘UN policy.’’
It remains unclear what advice, if any, the FCO’s legal advisors, headed by
Sir Franklin Berman, offered on the determination of genocide in Rwanda and the
responsibility of the British government, as a signatory to the 1948 UNCG, to abide
by this treaty. By contrast, in the United States, under the Freedom of Information
Act, some relevant memoranda from the Office of the Legal Advisor have been
released.10 But the rest of the story is hidden from view, and requests in the United
States for a congressional investigation into the decision-making process are ignored.
Only a tiny fraction of the government documents regarding this issue has been
released.
Peacekeeping in Rwanda
With hindsight, the creation by the UN Security Council of a feeble UN peacekeeping
mission for Rwanda—with its weak mandate and minimal capacity, suitable for only
the most benign environment—is seen to have been a tragic error. On the face of it,
the UN assignment in Rwanda was unambiguous, with a three-year civil war that
had ended in peace and a handshake between government and invading rebels.
The corrupt regime was to be reformed and a power-sharing government created.
This was classic, textbook peacekeeping; there would be no proactive soldiering,
no peace enforcement. Peacekeepers monitor compliance with cease-fires; they do
not seize weapons. The peacekeepers of the UN observe, they mediate, but they
do not compel the parties to cease hostilities, nor do they try to end human-rights
abuses.
In peacekeeping, the transition period, when the warring factions vie for power, is
the most dangerous. It is the time used by extremists to make the most of the vacuum,
to derail peace. In the case of Rwanda, by the time the UN peacekeepers arrived, it
was probably already too late. And just how half-hearted this UN mission was is plain
to see, for it lacked even the barest essentials. It was soon clear that the readiness level
of this paltry force bore no relationship at all to what was needed.
The timing for Rwanda and its fragile peace agreement could not have been worse.
The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was created as a small and rather
insignificant mission at a time when the Security Council was preoccupied elsewhere.
There was a crowded agenda and new demands on the council’s time; the end of
the Cold War had led to an evolution in peacekeeping, with a series of new high-cost,
large-scale, and open-ended missions created in the early 1990s. The Security Council
had enacted a blizzard of peacekeeping mandates, and some of them had proved
ambiguous, inadequate, and written with scant consideration for the realities on
the ground. In the former Yugoslavia there had been tragic mistakes, particularly
when the Security Council sent peacekeepers into situations with orders they
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could not follow. When UNAMIR was created, the council was responsible for
seventeen UN missions worldwide and some 80,000 peacekeepers in the field. It was
trying to keep track of problematic operations in Cambodia, in Somalia, and in the
former Yugoslavia. Rwanda seemed quiet. In comparison with other missions
it seemed even hopeful, and there existed a degree of optimism about the Arusha
peace accords.
Peacekeeping requires ceaseless political direction. In every operation throughout
the world, the mandate, authorized by the Security Council, provides crucial guidance.
By the end of February 1994, the mission for Rwanda was beginning to cause concern,
and at the end of February there was a series of violent incidents, with militia
seizing the center of Kigali and a series of political murders. These events were of such
concern that the Belgian foreign minister, Willy Claes, flew to Kigali, and almost
immediately upon his return home Belgium decided to ask the Security Council for
a more robust mandate for the peacekeepers. The Belgian government, which had
450 paratroopers in UNAMIR and intelligence operatives attached to its embassy in
Rwanda, warned that the mission was in the deepest trouble. It asserted that the
peacekeeping mandate must be increased to allow for a more robust UN response in
the face of increasing violence.11 In New York, urgent meetings were convened
by Belgium’s ambassador to the United Nations, Paul Noterdaeme. There was a
diplomatic blizzard from Belgian diplomats who believed that the peace agreement
in Rwanda was being sabotaged and that if this UN mission collapsed the result
would be a huge loss of life. The peacekeepers needed to be able to take proactive
action and to seize illegal and stockpiled weaponry; they needed better protection and
reinforcements. After the genocide, an enquiry by the Belgian Senate would reveal
how two members of the Security Council, the United Kingdom and the United States,
given these warnings, remained adamant that no further help should be given to
Rwanda. These two states were showing reluctance about the mission. In fact, given
the level of violence, they wanted a time limit imposed, for it seemed unwise
for peacekeepers to remain in a country where the peace agreement was collapsing.
Unless the situation improved and the peace agreement got back on track, the
UN peacekeepers would have to pull out completely.
This idea, which was discussed at an informal Security Council meeting on 5 April
1994, did not receive unanimous support. Ibrahim Gambari, the representative
for Nigeria, a non-permanent member of the council, argued that Rwanda—one of the
poorest countries in the world—should be given sufficient time to achieve democracy.
Rwanda should receive the same resources and attention given by the council to
other conflict zones, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, where the Council had
mandated more peacekeepers than anywhere else in the world.
By now the British government was in possession of its own information about
Rwanda. A report detailing the very real risks involved had been sent to London,
written by Edward Clay, High Commissioner in Kampala, Uganda, who—after a visit
to the Rwandan capital, Kigali—provided the FCO with details of what was
happening.12 One insider would later claim that had this report received the attention
it deserved, Britain’s record in the Security Council at this time would have been
somewhat different.
It has since been acknowledged that the British government was also reading
detailed cables about Rwanda from UNAMIR Force Commander Rome´o Dallaire with
desperate warnings of impending calamity13 It remains unclear how the British
government managed to obtain strictly internal UN documents.
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Also available to the British government was more public information from
human-rights groups, giving extensive detail about Rwanda: the formation and
training of a country-wide militia, the existence of death squads committing political
murder, and continuing arms purchases in contravention of the peace accord.
There was evidence of a racist propaganda campaign against the Tutsi minority in
extremist publications and over the airwaves of the newly created Radio-Te´le´vision
Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), which was relentless in its incitement to ethnic
hatred. The UN Commission on Human Rights had sent a special rapporteur, Bacre
Waly Ndiaye, to Rwanda; he thought the word ‘‘genocide’’ was appropriate to
describe the killing by the government of members of the Tutsi group. Ndiaye
warned of ‘‘the odious disinformation advocating ethnic and political intolerance,
hatred and violence.’’14
British journalist Richard Dowden, foreign editor of the Independent, was told
during a January 1994 visit to Rwanda that militia were being armed by the
government and that there were plans to promote mass killings of Tutsis throughout
the country. The warning came from Philippe Gaillard, chief delegate of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Gaillard warned that genocide
could take place. But Dowden later wrote that Gaillard was the only person who
spoke to him of genocide and that everyone else he had spoken to had been optimistic.
To write a ‘‘sensational story about impending genocide would have been dishonest
and irresponsible,’’ he thought.15
Among others who saw the warning signs was a Polish peacekeeper, Major
Stefan Stec, who described how, in the weeks beforehand, ‘‘genocide hung in the air.’’
The peacekeepers had opened reception centres for Tutsi families, who were
frequently trapped in their homes by Hutu Power militia and too scared to sleep at
home.16 Some of Kigali’s churches were also used in this way. Some Rwandans chose
exile. Others believed that with the United Nations in their country they would
be safe.
In all these circumstances, the British government may not have been as ignorant
as it professed to be.
Warning Signs in Kigali
In one telling paragraph in the 2005 Report of the Commission for Africa are these
words: ‘‘Just 5,500 troops with robust peace enforcement capabilities could have
saved half a million lives in Rwanda. Evidence shows that prevention can work.’’17
This, then, is most likely the first indication of an admission by British government
signatories of grievous errors made by politicians and civil servants on Britain’s
behalf in 1994.
The question of when exactly the government was aware that genocide was
underway is crucial. Some sources have confirmed that within weeks genocide
was apparent; the information came from the most reputable sources, including the
ICRC and the British agency Oxfam.
One now retired senior civil servant recalls that immediately before the genocide
the Foreign Office warned the Cabinet Office that there could be great loss of life
in Rwanda. There appears to have been an assumption that should the peace
agreement collapse, there would be many casualties, and that massacres would take
place similar to those that had taken place in neighbouring Burundi in October 1993,
when an estimated 50,000 people had been killed. In relation to Rwanda in late
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April 1994, another insider comments, ‘‘When it got to 100,000 dead we thought it
was a bit persistent.’’
In the United Kingdom, it was Oxfam that first publicly acknowledged the
genocide in a press release dated 29 April: ‘‘Oxfam fears genocide is happening in
Rwanda.’’ At this stage, the British government chose to obscure the reality, describing
what was happening only as ‘‘civil war.’’ In the Security Council in New York it was
the British ambassador, David Hannay, who first offered the idea that the UN
peacekeepers be withdrawn; he suggested leaving behind in Rwanda a ‘‘token force to
appease public opinion.’’ Hannay said that the peacekeepers could achieve very little
and that ambassadors should beware a repetition of Somalia, where a few months
earlier a peacekeeping mission had spiraled out of control, ending in ignominious
failure, at least for the US military. Peacekeeping was not appropriate in the midst
of civil war, Hannay said.18
But the situation in Rwanda was strikingly different from that which had existed
in Somalia a few months before. In Rwanda a civil war was under way, but so was
genocide—and at a terrible speed, in broad daylight, in schools, hospitals, clinics,
and churches, the places where terrified Rwandan citizens had sought refuge.
The eventual Security Council decision, made public on 21 April, to withdraw the bulk
of the UN mission may have encouraged the ge´nocidaires, for within a few hours of
this vote in New York the killing in Rwanda spread south.
In the days that followed, three non-permanent members of the Security Council—
the Czech Republic, New Zealand, and Nigeria—made every effort to try to persuade
both the United Kingdom and the United States to focus their attention not just on
the civil war but on the daily murder of thousands upon thousands of civilians.
These three states tried to persuade the great powers that the council should recognize
that genocide was underway. Were the genocide to be recognized, they argued, there
would be a legal and a moral imperative to do something about it. These countries
also lobbied for reinforcements for UNAMIR. But the resistance was determined,
and at the end of April there was an eight-hour debate in the Security Council about
the use of the word ‘‘genocide’’ in relation to Rwanda. During this debate, the United
Kingdom argued strenuously against the use of the word. In the end, the council
reached a compromise. It was thanks only to the drafting ability of the British
that the Presidential Statement issued by the council used wording from the 1948
UNCG but avoided using the word itself. The statement read in part,
The Security Council recalls that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the
intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable
under international law.19
That same day in Geneva, the headquarters of the ICRC, whose delegates were
operating an emergency hospital in Kigali, issued the most strongly worded statement
in that organization’s history. It described how whole families were being extermi-
nated, and, in a clear message to the Security Council, the ICRC demanded
that measures be taken to put an end immediately to what it called the ‘‘terrifying
mechanism of the massacres.’’20 By now evidence of mass slaughter was leaking
through Rwandan rivers: an estimated 40,000 bodies were removed from Lake
Victoria. Oxfam, in spite of a lack of interest from the British press, kept up the
pressure, and on 3 May a letter was sent to Prime Minister Major informing him
that genocide was happening in Rwanda. But the British government continued
to want to deny the reality. On 9 May, the House of Commons was told by
Mark Lennox-Boyd, the parliamentary under-secretary of state for foreign and
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commonwealth affairs: ‘‘There are estimates that more than 200,000 may have
perished in recent fighting in Rwanda . . . it is a horrific and tragic civil war.’’21 Yet by
that time the latest ICRC estimate was that 250,000 people had been murdered—not
killed in a civil war.
That murder of this magnitude could unfold without the government of the
day’s making any statement on the issue of genocide to Parliament is extraordinary.
It was not until six weeks after the genocide began that there was a debate in
Parliament, and only because one Opposition member managed to get the issue on to
the agenda. On 24 May, Labour MP Tony Worthington expressed shock that so little
attention had been paid to Rwanda. Worthington told an almost empty House
of Commons at close to midnight, ‘‘It is inconceivable that an atrocity in which half
a million white people had died would not have been extensively debated in the
House.’’ Worthington said that the press had a terrible tendency to dismiss the events
as tribalism. ‘‘Genocide is certainly involved,’’ he continued.22 There had never been
a clearer example of genocide, and he warned the House of Commons that Britain was
a signatory to the 1948 UNCG. He was told that Rwanda was in the ‘‘midst of civil war’’
and that the UK ‘‘was at the forefront of those insisting the UN should remain
engaged.’’23
This was not quite the case. In the Security Council, as we have seen, it was the
Czech Republic, New Zealand, and Nigeria, three non-permanent members, that
were insisting that the UN remain engaged in Rwanda. A month later, Worthington
made another plea for information about Rwanda: ‘‘What kind of House and
Government do not seek to make a statement when 500,000 are murdered?’’
Worthington asked on 22 June. ‘‘We are on the Security Council,’’ he reminded the
House of Commons.24
That genocide in Rwanda had occurred was officially recognized by an impartial
commission of experts, created by the Security Council in July 1994, whose interim
report to the council in October 1994 documented that ‘‘a concerted, planned,
systematic and methodical’’ campaign against the Tutsi and Hutu opponents of
the extremists had taken place. There were ample grounds to prove that the 1948
UNCG had been violated between 6 April and 5 July 1994.25 A provisional list of
massacre sites was produced. Corpses were still piled high in classrooms and churches,
strewn across the country in an apocalyptic landscape.
As previously noted, the world’s catastrophic failure in Rwanda has been examined
by the United Nations through an independent inquiry seeking to establish the role
of that organization in what happened. The Carlsson Report into the actions of
the United Nations during the genocide in Rwanda was authorized by Kofi Annan,
who became secretary-general in December 1996 after the United States vetoed
a second term for Boutros Boutros-Ghali.
This report, published in December 1999, calls the genocide ‘‘one of the most
abhorrent events of the twentieth century.’’26 The report leaves no doubt that each
part of the UN system, and in particular the secretary-general, the Secretariat,
the Security Council, and the member states, must assume and acknowledge
their responsibility in the failure.
To this day the British government has not done so.
For three months of genocide, from the beginning to the end, all UN governments
and official bodies continued to recognize as legitimate the government of Rwanda,
a government hastily sworn into office as the genocide began and intended to replace
those government members, part of Rwanda’s pro-democracy movement, who had
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just been murdered. It was called an interim government, and for the next three
months it would create a regime based on genocide. This government was represented
on the UN Security Council; for the duration of the genocide it ran a spin campaign to
convince the world that people were dying in the renewed civil war. Not one
government called on the ge´nocidaires to stop the genocide. Not one government called
for Rwanda’s representative to be suspended from the Security Council.
The British government was reluctant to take even the slightest action—such as
jamming the hate radio. The government paid no attention to either stabilizing
or reinforcing the tiny garrison of UN peacekeepers that had stayed behind in Rwanda.
At first Lt-Gen Dallaire, following the loss of ten Belgian peacekeepers in the
first hours of the crisis, was told to plan for total evacuation of the force, but he refused
and stayed on in Rwanda with volunteers. His was the ‘‘token force’’ that Hannay
mentioned. These soldiers, mostly from Ghana and Tunisia, had been mandated by
the Security Council to try to negotiate a cease-fire in the civil war. Beyond this
mandate, Dallaire and his men were also trying to save as many people as possible,
sometimes risking their own lives to do so. In daily contact with Dallaire were officials
in the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, headed by
Kofi Annan, who were making desperate efforts on Dallaire’s behalf to get him rations,
gasoline, water—anything at all. But Dallaire and his men were not even resupplied.
In one cable to headquarters he wrote,
The ineffective reaction to meeting the critical needs of this mission is nothing less than
scandalous from the word go and even bordering on the irresponsible.. . . This has
directly led to the loss of many more Rwandan lives, to the casualties among our
troops.27
Reinforcements were available for Rwanda. A Ghanaian company of soldiers
was on stand-by in Nairobi, and other African countries also offered troops.28What was
urgently needed was an airlift to get them to Rwanda and about thirty armored
personnel carriers to help protect troops on the ground. In response to these urgent
requests from UN officials, the British Ministry of Defence and its then minister,
Malcolm Rifkind, offered fifty four-tonne four-wheel-drive trucks—but no means to
get them to Rwanda. Still, the offer allowed the Major government to claim, on 13 July,
that the United Kingdom had ‘‘responded to the request of the Secretary-General
for the supply of equipment.’’29 It was yet another tactic used by the UK government to
deflect the reality of the situation. A variety of British government representatives
would subsequently claim that the United Kingdom was doing all that the UN
had asked of it. It was for the want of fuel, not courage, that more Rwandans were
not rescued.
In June 1994 Dallaire flew to Nairobi, where, at a press conference, he told
international journalists they had dropped the ball: they were allowing ‘‘fence-sitting
politicians off the hook for the Rwandan genocide.’’30 But with no outcry about
genocide in the press, no choices were given and no risks taken. The genocide,
described in British newspapers with inappropriate and racist cliche´s such as ‘‘tribal
bloodletting,’’ gave the impression that what was happening was too terrible for
‘‘foreigners’’ to prevent; this bolstered the line from the UK diplomats and politicians
who kept insisting that only a massive and dramatic intervention would succeed and
that such an intervention was out of the question in the midst of a civil war.
Rwanda’s genocide occurred in the year in which we wept through Steven
Spielberg’s Schindler’s List; it was happening while Western leaders walked along
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the D-Day beaches and celebrated the defeat of fascism. It was left to
‘‘UN peacekeepers’’ to take the blame for Rwanda.
In both London and Washington there are politicians and civil servants who made
decisions in 1994 that cost the lives of an incalculable number of people. They should
bear full responsibility. The 1948 UNCG was the world’s first truly universal,
comprehensive, and codified protection of human rights. It stands for a fundamental
and important principle: that whatever evil may befall any group, nation, or people,
it is a matter of concern not just for those people but for the entire human family.
The United Nations was founded on the commitment to the rule of international
law—and to a rules-based international society. The erosion of this law and its
abuse by democratic politicians should be of some concern. In an effective democracy, it
is the job of journalists to ensure that governments do not evade their responsibility
under international law and that they are held accountable for their actions. This
story is massively incomplete, as the author is the first to admit. We should never
forget the gaps.
In a recent off-the-record interview with a foreign office insider, someone who
later became a senior figure in the government of Tony Blair, I asked why the British
response had been so poor. This was the shocking and cynical reply: ‘‘Of course we
didn’t do anything . . . [about Rwanda] . . .Neither the press nor the public was
interested.’’
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Introduction
To begin, I’d like to describe the origins of the research project that ultimately became
The Order of Genocide. I first traveled to Rwanda as a journalist in the mid-1990s,
and, during my travels there and in what was then Zaire, I became deeply interested in
the dynamics that ultimately led to the 1994 genocide. From my perspective as a
journalist traveling in the region, the genocide was an absolutely seminal event,
but one that was poorly understood. Eventually I returned to the United States and
began a PhD program in political science at the University of California, Berkeley,
where I began to study the origins of genocide and mass violence, African politics,
and the history of the Great Lakes region. The Order of Genocide is based on my
PhD dissertation.
Three related questions drove my initial inquiry. First, what explains the ability of
Rwandan elites to mobilize a large number of citizens effectively and quickly during
the genocide? The literature on African states consistently indicates that governments
are relatively weak, especially outside the capital. Yet in Rwanda state authorities
successfully solicited the participation of hundreds of thousands of citizens in an
extermination campaign. Second, what explains the participation of ordinary civilians
in the genocide? When I began to research Rwanda in the late 1990s there was much
speculation but little by way of satisfactory answers to this question. Yet given the
scale of participation, understanding the dynamics and conditions driving individuals
seemed crucial. Third, why did the elites choose the strategy they did? The literature
on Rwanda was clear that governing, military, and party officials fomented mass
violence; the genocide was not a spontaneous eruption of hatred. Moreover, an
instrumentalist consensus dominated the literature: elites were said to have
deliberately advocated violence to protect and promote their interests. But instru-
mentalist hypotheses go only so far; they do not say why elites chose a strategy of
genocide over alternatives.
As I considered these questions, a separate set of concerns began to occupy me.
In particular, I became concerned about the gap in detailed evidence about the
genocide. Most existing empirical information was anecdotal or focused on the top
(such as discussions of the history of ethnicity or examinations of national-level
propaganda before and during the genocide). There was relatively little empirical
information about the dynamics of the genocide in rural areas, where the absolute
majority of violence occurred.1 In short, the situation I found as I began to research
Rwanda was that a number of key questions remained unanswered and there was
little systematically collected evidence that could be used to evaluate different
hypotheses. To compensate, I sought to create a research design that would allow me to
generate new empirical information and to evaluate different arguments.
As many who read this journal know, generating evidence about the dynamics of
genocide presents specific problems. Three in particular stood out for me as I started
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my research. First, in the aftermath of genocide and the wars in the Congo, trauma
and fear were widespread. Second, narratives were highly politicized, and individuals
across the political spectrum presented highly interested and stylized accounts. Third,
because the topic was the subject of criminal prosecutions, the research questions
had inevitable legal and political implications and were also of concern to institutional
oversight boards, with whose regulations I, like many US-based researchers, had
to comply.
Research Design
Nonetheless, I designed a field research program that consisted of three main stages.
Because my questions focused on the dynamics of violence, I decided to focus primarily,
though not exclusively, on those who took part in the killing. The first and main
research phase was a nationwide survey of imprisoned perpetrators. For the survey,
I used a stratified random sampling method to select and interview sentenced
perpetrators who had pleaded guilty in Rwanda’s domestic courts. The central
research instrument was a semi-structured questionnaire, which I designed
to evaluate competing hypotheses about the dynamics of violence and participation
in it. In total, using this method, I interviewed 210 prisoners in fifteen central prisons
across Rwanda.
The second research phase involved comparing the dynamics of genocidal violence
in five Rwandan communes (the main local unit of administration in 1994). During
my first research phase, I discovered that the patterns of mobilization that led to the
onset of genocide varied from commune to commune (more on this below). In addition,
there was one commune under government control where genocide did not occur.
For this second research phase, therefore, I selected four communes that exhibited
variation in how genocide began as well as the one commune under government
control, Giti, where genocide did not take place. I then studied the dynamics of violence
in each commune in depth through interviews with perpetrators, survivors, current
and former government officials, and non-participating Hutus.
The third stage of research entailed return trips to prisons. During the first two
phases, one clear pattern had emerged: in most communities, a nucleus of core
perpetrators was central to how the violence unfolded. While some of those individuals
fell into my random sample in the first phase, most respondents were lower-level
perpetrators. Thus, for the third research phase, I selected particular individuals to
interview, ranging from top communal authorities to young men who were particularly
active killers in the genocide. I interviewed about nineteen individuals using
this method. In addition to this field research, I also collected as much information
as I could from secondary sources, such as court documents, human-rights reports,
government studies, journalist accounts, and scholarship.
Principal Findings
One important finding from my research is that there was significant regional and
local variation in when and how the violence started. Immediately after President
Juve´nal Habyarimana’s assassination—the trigger for the genocide—national hard-
liners seized control of the Rwandan state and called for the killing of all Tutsis
and prominent Hutu political opponents. However, that call did not translate into
actual violence at the same time in all regions. In some areas, genocidal violence began
within days of the president’s assassination; in other areas, however, it did not begin
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until four or five days after his death, while in still others the violence took two
weeks or more to get started. In many areas, Hutu leaders and ordinary civilians
initially responded negatively to calls from the central government to kill Tutsis.
By and large, the areas that initially resisted efforts to start the violence were those
where the domestic Hutu political opposition had the most support. Genocidal violence
ultimately began, and succeeded, in those areas, but not before an important delay and
not without a power struggle among Hutus.
In terms of how violence began, significant variation existed among local areas.
In some places, local administration officials clearly started and directed the killing.
In other areas, however, the push came from military officers. In still others, political
party leaders and militia took charge. In some areas, local elites outside the official
administrative hierarchies mobilized to assume control. And in many areas some
combination of these occurred: soldiers worked with local officials or militia and the
rural elite worked with political party officials.
The point to emphasize is that, even though the genocidal outcome was similar
across Rwanda, how and when the violence started varied considerably. Not all Hutus
responded in the same way to the call to commit genocide. That finding is inconsistent
with some common hypotheses about the genocide, particularly the idea that the
decision to take part in the genocide stemmed from a widespread racist culture and
indoctrination; it is also inconsistent with the claim that the genocide was seamlessly
and hierarchically orchestrated, with local officials and peasants blindly following
orders. In fact, the spread of genocidal violence looked more dynamic, like a cascade
of tipping points, rather than being meticulously prepared and implemented.
I collected demographic information from perpetrators, including age, occupation,
number of children, literacy, and years of education. The general finding is that the
perpetrator profile, judging from my sample, was quite similar to that of the adult male
Hutu population in Rwanda at the time of the genocide. In other words, on the whole,
the perpetrator population was not comparatively younger, more unemployed,
or better educated. Rather, the perpetrators were average Rwandan men.
With respect to ethnicity, I found little evidence of widespread interpersonal ethnic
hatred. On a series of indicators—interethnic personal relations, attitudes toward
ethnic intermarriage, and family connections to Tutsis through intermarriage—the
survey yielded consistent evidence among respondents of positive pre-genocide ethnic
interaction. That said, many respondents spoke in categorical terms about ‘‘Hutus’’
and ‘‘Tutsis,’’ in particular when discussing the very tense period after Habyarimana’s
assassination. Some respondents also repeated elements of the genocidal regime’s
propaganda, such as the idea that the rebels killed Hutu children and disemboweled
pregnant women. On the other hand, certain commonly cited propaganda elements
had limited resonance. For example, less than 10% of respondents had heard of—let
alone respected—the infamous ‘‘Hutu Ten Commandments.’’
To investigate the issue of motivation, I asked respondents direct and indirect
questions about how and why they chose to participate in the genocide. As expected,
respondents expressed a range of motivations, from looting to joining attacks to avoid
suspicion that they were hiding Tutsis in their homes. However, two main types of
motivations emerged from these interviews. The first was some form of intra-Hutu
intimidation. Many respondents said that once the violence started in their
communities, they faced strong pressure from other Hutus to participate and feared
negative consequences for themselves and their families if they refused. The second
most common motivation was war-related: respondents said that, in the aftermath of
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Habyarimana’s death, they feared that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was
invading Rwanda and was killing Hutus.
This discussion of my findings is very brief. Considerably more detail, evaluation,
and triangulation of the findings, as well as historical analysis of prior periods of
violence, can all be found in the book.
The Argument
In The Order of Genocide, I conclude that three main factors drove the genocide
in Rwanda. First, war: I argue that the context of war was critical for the outcome.
War provided the essential rationale for mass killing: security. The logic of Rwanda’s
genocide was predicated on eliminating a threat, on self-protection, and on
re-establishing order. Moreover, the war that took place during the genocide was
intense and defensive, and thus it created a climate of acute uncertainty and
insecurity, sometimes a feeling of panic. That context was critical in motivating some
individuals to foment violence; it was also a key reason that individuals who gravitated
toward extreme measures gained the upper hand wherever they were.
The assassination of Rwanda’s president was part of this dynamic. The
assassination ruptured Rwanda’s political order and thereby created a temporary
gap in authority. The president’s death independently caused anger, leading to calls
for violent revenge; the assassination augmented the anxiety, fear, and confusion of
the war; and the rupture in political order also set the stage for local power struggles.
This last factor is particularly important. After the president’s death, Hutu hardliners
succeeded in gaining control of the state and urged war against the Tutsi ‘‘enemy.’’
That idea—war against the Tutisis—then became the terms around which local actors
asserted power and authority in their communities. The hardliners and those who
adhered to the program of genocide ultimately won the upper hand in almost all areas
not yet lost to the rebels. But such would not likely have happened outside a context
of war, including the president’s assassination.
Given the importance of war and of the president’s assassination, as well as my
findings about how the genocide unfolded at the local level, I conclude that a dynamic
of escalation was a critical factor in the genocide. That, in turn, leads me to argue
that while the genocide was organized, systematic, and ultimately promoted by
the hardliners who took control of the state after the president’s assassination,
the genocide—meaning here the countrywide extermination of the Tutsi population—
was not necessarily meticulously planned in advance, as is often claimed. To be clear,
I argue that the Hutu hardliners who controlled the state are responsible for
the actions they took and, ultimately, for the genocide; however, the dynamics that led
them to foment mass violence, and to succeed in doing so, were in part situational and,
in particular, had to do with the course of the war, including the president’s
assassination.
Second, Rwandan state institutions are critical to understanding why genocide
happened and the participatory character of the violence. The Rwandan state matters
for a number of reasons. First, the state has unusual depth and resonance at the
local level in Rwanda, which meant that, by controlling the state, the hardliners
had the capacity to enforce their decisions countrywide. Second, control of the state
allowed the hardliners to associate killing Tutsis with authority, thus equating
violence with de facto policy. Third, Rwanda has a long history of obligatory labor, and
expectations derived from that history contributed to large-scale civilian mobilization
during the genocide. The potency of the Rwandan state cannot be taken for granted,
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especially because most African states are weak—particularly in rural areas. Thus, in
addition to demonstrating the importance of the state to the outcome of genocide, I also
explain in the book why Rwanda’s state is so effective at civilian mobilization. Here I
emphasize Rwandan political history, dating to the precolonial period, as well as the
country’s dense geography.
Therein lies a tension. In The Order of Genocide I make the case that insecurity,
uncertainty, anger, and fear related to war and to the president’s assassination drove
the promulgation and spread of violence. However, once coalitions of actors emerged
to win effective control in their communities, they drew on the power of Rwanda’s
local state and the resonance of authority to unleash violence quickly and effectively.
The nature of Rwanda’s institutions and geography also limited exit options, which
both drove high rates of Hutu participation and limited escape opportunities for
Tutsis. The result was a very rapid killing campaign.
Third, ethnicity mattered, but in surprising ways. Overall, I found that ethnic
prejudice, ethnic antipathy, manipulation by racist propaganda, and nationalist
commitments were not the primary drivers. However, the logic of extermination in
Rwanda depended on the idea that Tutsis are of a piece. The genocidal mandate from
the hardliners was to equate ‘‘enemy’’ with ‘‘Tutsi’’ and to declare that Rwanda’s
‘‘enemies’’ had to be eliminated. I argue in the book that the mechanism that allowed
this process to happen is collective ethnic categorization. In case after case, when
justifying killing civilians, perpetrators substituted the category ‘‘Tutsi’’ for the
individuals they were attacking.
The hardliners did not create this category from thin air. Ethnic and racial
categorization has a deep and significant political history, dating, in particular, to
the early colonial period and extending in periodic but pronounced ways into the first
two postcolonial republics. In short, the ethnic/racial categories were ingrained, even if
ethnic hatred was not, and those categories ultimately were essential to the character
of violence—to the fact that violence in Rwanda became genocide.
What caused a shift from an awareness of ethnic categories to collective
categorization and violence? I argue the principal mechanisms had to do with
uncertainty, fear, social pressure, and opportunity. In the aggregate, Hutus
participated in genocide because they wanted to protect themselves during a war
and a period of intense uncertainty; because they felt that complying with those who
told them to kill would be less costly than not complying; and because they
opportunistically used the period of confusion and violence to obtain power and
property. These dynamics, I argue, are inseparable from the specific context of war and
from the nature of Rwandan state institutions and geography.
Implications for Post-Genocide Rwanda
Like the presentation of my findings, my argument here is truncated.
In closing, I would like to discuss briefly—again, more detail is in the book—the
implications of my findings and argument for post-genocide Rwanda.
Rwanda’s RPF-dominated post-genocide government has favored strong control
over public political discourse and maintained a strong military emphasis. These
policies are based, at least in part, on an interpretation of mass participation in the
genocide that tends to see the genocide as an undifferentiated event and
the main cause of participation as mass beliefs and mass racist indoctrination.
This interpretation essentially posits a persistent post-genocide threat, because the
Hutu population is considered to be either genocidal or brainwashed and thus prone
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to becoming genocidal. The logical response to such an ongoing threat is strong
coercive control over the potentially dangerous population.
However, there is substantial risk that a strong security outlook, even though it
will keep the peace in the short term, will alienate large portions of the population and
sow the seeds of instability in the long term. Here the evidence I collected could
contribute to rethinking policy. First, the evidence does not support collective blame of
the Hutu population. Not all Hutus were ge´nocidaires, and not all perpetrators
participated to the same degree. Second, the genocide was not perpetrated in a
seamless, ‘‘machine’’-like manner. Rather, the violence was the outcome of local-level
struggles for dominance, and many initially resisted or tried to avoid becoming
involved in it. Third, the evidence suggests that while ethnic categories were an
important background condition for the genocide, neither interpersonal ethnic enmity
nor a deeply imbibed racist culture was the wellspring of most individuals’
participation in the violence. Rather, specific conditions in Rwanda triggered the
saliency of ethnic categories and enabled a dynamic of violence to take hold. Thus, in
considerations of how prone Rwanda is to future violence, the stress should fall on
those situational factors that sowed the seeds of insecurity and destabilization that
allowed a dynamic of violence to take root.
All this indicates that some key conditions that facilitated the genocide in the first
place are no longer present. By extension, the prospects for post-genocide confidence
among social groups may be greater than many Rwandan and outside observers fear.
Nothing about social reconstruction after mass violence is easy, but my evidence shows
that Rwanda is not, and was not, a nation of people predisposed to violence.
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Scott Straus’s The Order of Genocide stands as a groundbreaking work. It asks and
answers some of the most troubling questions about the genocide—how and why it
occurred and how and why so many ordinary men and women participated in it. Straus
brings extraordinary assets to this ambitious project, including his background as a
journalist working in the region (before obtaining his PhD), scholarly expertise in
genocide and African politics, and an acute sensitivity to method and evidence. The
result is a book that adds a great deal of knowledge to our understanding of the
Rwandan case and of genocide in general.
The Order of Genocide boasts multiple strengths, not the least of which is Straus’s
ability to hone in on the most important questions. Straus asks, for example, ‘‘Why did
the hardliners choose genocide as their strategy and why were they so successful?’’
(63). Hardliners do not always seize on genocide as their preferred strategy for staying
in power, and it is not clear from the evidence, argues Straus, that the hardliners in
Kigali had done so before the assassination of the Rwandan president on 6 April 1994,
the date most observers mark as the start of the genocide. Straus argues convincingly
that the genocide was not ‘‘meticulously planned,’’ as many have maintained, but was
the hardliners’ response to an increasingly threatening and dynamic situation.
Genocide was not the first strategy they took; rather, it was the one they took when
they felt the most threatened, that is, when the RPF had (allegedly) killed the
president and had begun a swift advance through the country. This argument is novel
and extremely convincing; it also illustrates the author’s sophisticated and thorough
treatment of new and existing evidence.
What guides Straus throughout the book is a keen awareness that methods matter.
He remains skeptical of any single source of data, be it the words of confessed killers,
the decisions of an international judicial body, or any other text. This skepticism drives
him to look for multiple ways to triangulate the data. For example, he compares
different periods in Rwandan political history to look for common dynamics driving
episodes of past violence targeted at Tutsi; he situates the testimony of confessed
killers within that of other witnesses and survivors to probe the veracity of the killers’
words; he tests his own argument as he goes along to see if each subsequent step is
consistent with previous ones. All of these methods show a great deal of exacting logic
and creativity in pursuing answers to extremely difficult questions. Straus is also
transparent about the choices and assumptions he makes. A person might disagree
with any of his decisions, but no one can fault Straus for hiding how he arrived at
either his data or conclusions.
It is Straus’s methodological conscientiousness that makes the findings from the
interviews he conducted with confessed and sentenced perpetrators a seminal
contribution to the study of genocide and mass killing. These findings are critical
because they put to rest many of the tropes surrounding the genocide. Indeed, what
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is striking about these data is what Straus does not find. He does not find evidence
that extremist radio or ideologies compelled these men to murder; instead, he
finds that their reasons were much more immediate—they feared being killed by
other Hutu perpetrators or by the equally fearsome RPF if they did not join in the
carnage.
Straus also finds no evidence to support the common argument that ethnic hatred
drove people to kill. He does find that among the most aggressive killers, ties to Tutsis
were less extensive and expressions of antipathy toward Tutsi more common. The
vast majority of confessed killers, however, report that they had no problems with their
Tutsi neighbors before the genocide. What ruptured relations were key events that
caused widespread panic and insecurity, such as particularly deadly RPF attacks and
the assassination of the president.
Finally, Straus finds no evidence of a ‘‘culture of obedience’’ whereby Rwandans
blindly followed orders to kill Tutsi. His informants do say that they were following
orders to kill, but Straus eschews a facile interpretation of these statements. Peasant
killers followed orders because mobilization often occurred through face-to-face
confrontations that left little room for refusal or evasion.
Straus is exceedingly thoughtful in interpreting his data. He never overreaches
but always leaves the door open for the possibility that new evidence or a new way of
looking at the evidence might shed new light on his reading of events. This readiness to
reassess his thinking shows Straus’s commitment to understanding the genocide in its
full complexity and depth, rather than in a superficial or overly pat way.
To be sure, there are times when Straus could go further. For example, he argues
that people were afraid of the RPF but does not consider other possible sources of this
fear, such as how the RPF was waging war. The atrocities the RPF committed against
civilians were not pure myth, after all, but had been witnessed by countless people.
Straus might have also looked for patterns in how local leaders mobilized people
for mass murder, rather than assuming that mobilization occurred randomly (120).
Given the level of surveillance that was in place, the population density, and the
topography (all of which Straus chronicles nicely), it might be equally likely that local
leaders knew very well whom they could tap as ‘‘enforcers’’ and, by extension, who
would be most vulnerable to recruitment into mass murder. Understanding patterns of
mobilization would also have helped Straus to develop a theory of agency on the part of
ordinary perpetrators.
Straus’s argument regarding the role played by ethnicity (or ‘‘race,’’ as he calls it) is
the weakest of the three main arguments he makes about the causes of the genocide.
His arguments about the critical role played by the war and about local elites’ use of
violence to establish authority are extremely well documented and well argued; with
respect to ethnicity, however, he makes a less than convincing leap from people’s
awareness of ethnic difference to the mechanism he calls ‘‘collective ethnic
categorization,’’ which became activated at crisis moments. From his data, it is not
entirely clear whether ‘‘collective ethnic categorization’’ was a product of or, precursor
to, people’s participation in the violence. It may well have been both, but Straus’s
analysis does not probe this distinction.
Straus can hardly be faulted for any of these lapses, however. No book can do every-
thing, and this one does much more than most. Indeed, other scholars would do well to
emulate its breadth, depth, and systematicity. Itsmost important contribution, however,
may be the tenacity and courage that Straus shows in explaining the unthinkable—how
otherwise ordinary people could imagine, conceive, and carry out genocide.
Genocide Studies and Prevention 2:3 November 2007
266
Ordinariness and Orders: Explaining
Popular Participation in the Rwandan
Genocide
Lars Waldorf
Centre for International Human Rights, Institute of
Commonwealth Studies, University of London
The most troubling and perplexing aspect of the Rwandan Genocide is why so many
joined the killings so quickly. This participation seems even less comprehensible given
the violence’s terrifying intimacy: ordinary killers often turned on their Tutsi
neighbors and family members, using machetes and other everyday tools. Searching
for answers, journalists and even some scholars have clutched at comforting
metaphors and mono-causal explanations: a ‘‘blood orgy,’’ tribalism, ethnic hatred,
hate radio, a ‘‘culture of obedience,’’ structural violence, and ‘‘conspiracy to murder.’’
With bracing clarity and scrupulous fairness, Scott Straus painstakingly demolishes
these simplistic notions and sets a new standard for empirical research on mass
violence in The Order of Genocide.
Using data from interviews with 210 convicted, confessed perpetrators and with a
range of actors in five communities, Straus constructs a sophisticated explanation of
how genocidal violence happened at the local level. First, he finds that most
perpetrators in rural Rwanda were ordinary farmers (though rural elites and young
thugs played a crucial role in driving the violence). Second, most of those ordinary
perpetrators committed genocide for fairly banal reasons: ‘‘the Rwandans’ motivations
were considerably more ordinary and routine than the extraordinary crimes they
helped commit’’ (96). Third, he calculates that between 175,000 and 210,000 civilians
participated in genocidal violence—an enormous number, to be sure, but far fewer
than the half-million who now stand accused in Rwanda’s community courts (gacaca).
Finally, he identifies three key factors behind the widespread participation: (1) anger,
fear, and uncertainty caused by the renewed civil war; (2) opportunism linked to local
power struggles; and (3) social pressure and coercion derived from intra-group
dynamics, state authority, communal labor obligations, and social surveillance. The
latter point is perhaps Straus’s most controversial finding. Challenging popular
conceptions of the Rwandan Genocide, he writes that ‘‘intra-ethnic coercion and
pressure [among Hutu] appear to have been greater determinants of genocidal
participation than interethnic enmity [between Hutu and Tutsi]’’ (148). This
explanation is consistent with many of the testimonies I have heard in gacaca trials,
but more systematic analyses of those testimonies and more micro-level studies are
needed.
A constant refrain that Straus hears from confessed perpetrators is that they were
following orders and that disobedience would have led to punishment or even death.
This sounds like egregious self-absolution from admitted killers, but Straus makes us
take it—and them—seriously. Nonetheless, it would have been helpful to parse
perpetrators’ motivations more closely to distinguish better among group conformity
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(peer pressure), obedience to authority, and coercion or duress. These distinctions
matter enormously for imputing legal guilt, assigning moral blame,
and understanding why ordinary men kill. In his classic study of German police
reservists in Nazi-occupied Poland, Christopher Browning emphasizes the need to
distinguish obedience from conformity, particularly as perpetrators are more likely to
invoke authority to diminish (or erase) their personal responsibility.1
In explaining obedience, Straus is right to emphasize the historical continuity of
Rwanda’s strong administrative state and compulsory labor mobilizations. Yet it is
also important to recall Rwanda’s long (if less well known) tradition of peasant
disobedience. In the 1980s, for example, peasants uprooted state-owned coffee bushes
as the world price of coffee fell, and they often shirked mandatory communal labor
(umuganda). Even those who participated in the genocide sometimes resisted
government orders to bury the rotting corpses. More recently, the current regime
has had difficulty in compelling people to participate in gacaca trials. I once saw
farmers running into banana groves to avoid local officials who were rounding up
community members to attend gacaca. All this suggests that ordinary Rwandans
have a great deal of agency: they choose to conform or obey when it best suits their
self-interest.
Straus runs into a major explanatory difficulty with his emphasis on social
pressure and coercion. Having estimated a high of 210,000 perpetrators, he is forced to
recognize a problem: ‘‘If my hypothesis is correct that . . . social pressure and coercion
played an important role, then why were there notmore genocide perpetrators?’’ (120).
He offers three possibilities: first, some of those approached were able to get out of
killing (by paying a fine or feigning illness); second, the mobilization of perpetrators
was random (and thus partly a matter of luck); third, most of the killing was finished
before more people could be mobilized. As Straus recognizes, further research is
needed to answer the crucial question of why some became perpetrators and some did
not. Just as importantly, we need to understand the motivations of, and pressures on,
ordinary bystanders and ordinary rescuers. Did they perceive the level of social
pressure and coercion differently, and, if so, why?
There are several limitations to Straus’s study, which he is the first to
acknowledge. I want to note just three here. First, most of his informants were
fairly low-level perpetrators, so it is not surprising that they offer a defense of
‘‘following orders.’’ Perhaps as more members of the rural elites and the genocidal
government confess in order to win reduced sentences, there will be opportunities to
investigate their motivations and decision making. It will be particularly interesting
to see whether they corroborate the statements of those ordinary killers who claim to
have been unwilling executioners. Second, most Rwandan perpetrators (even those
already convicted) have incentives to minimize their role, rationalize their actions, and
shift the blame to others. This process is often linked to an economy of guilt within
Rwanda’s prisons, where prisoners buy and sell confessions, inculpations, and
exculpations. In addition, prisoners are acutely aware of how their confessions
(especially the naming of accomplices) will affect their families on the outside, setting
them up as possible targets for revenge.
Finally, Rwandans are highly practiced at what one political scientist elsewhere
has termed ‘‘ritualized dissimulation.’’2 When 91% of his respondents tell him they
have never disobeyed authorities, Straus reacts with appropriate skepticism, while
also recognizing how important it is for them to be perceived as complying with
authority. Yet this makes it all the more necessary to measure perpetrators’ narratives
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in terms of compliance with the current regime’s ideological discourse. Indeed, his
respondents’ accounts are consistent with the government’s emphasis on explaining
the genocide in terms of ‘‘bad leadership’’ and an uneducated peasantry inculcated
in habits of obedience. Straus’s interviewees may also have minimized ethnic
tensions before the genocide, in conformity with the current regime’s suppression of
ethnicity.
Overall, Straus’s book takes it place besides Jan Gross’s Neighbors3 and
Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men as essential reading for anyone wanting to
understand how ordinary men can so quickly become ge´nocidaires. Such under-
standing is essential to preventing genocide. For, as Rwanda reminds us, mass
violence is impossible without widespread civilian participation, cooperation, and
passivity.
Notes
1. Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final
Solution in Poland (New York: Penguin, 2001), 174.
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Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 82.
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Book Review
African Rights, with photographs by Jenny Matthews. Father Wenceslas
Munyeshyaka: In the Eyes of the Survivors of Sainte Famille. London:
African Rights, 1999. Pp. 96, paper. $10.00 US
Reviewed by Samuel Totten, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
The headline of the 21 July 2007 edition of the New Times (billed as ‘‘Rwanda’s First
Daily’’) reads, ‘‘Genocidaires Munyeshyaka, Bucyibaruta Are Finally Arrested.’’ In the
article itself, journalist James Munyaneza reports the following:
Munyeshyaka, who was until his arrest an active priest, was last November sentenced
by Rwanda’s Military Tribunal to life imprisonment in absentia for his role in the
slaughter of over 200 people at St[e]. Famille Parish, St. Paul Pastoral Centre and
CELA [Centre for the Teaching of African Languages] in Kigali during the 1994
Genocide.
Rwanda has for the last decade been calling on France to apprehend Genocide suspects
on her territory, so did the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) last
month.
. . .The two men [Munyeshyaka and Laurent Bucyibaruta] have been arrested a month
after the ICTR prosecution transferred their cases to Paris, implying that they will most
likely be prosecuted in France. However, what remains unclear is whether Paris will
extradite Munyeshyaka to Rwanda to serve his life sentence since he is already a
convict.
According to an ICTR charge sheet, Munyeshyaka, 49, is charged with genocide and
three crimes against humanity (rape, extermination and murder). (2)
When Father Wenceslas Munyeshyaka: In the Eyes of the Survivors of Sainte
Famille was published in 1999, Munyeshyaka was still on the run from justice.
Although Munyeshyaka had been arrested in France, following the filing of a petition
by a lawyer on the behalf of the Rwandese community in France (which included
relatives of various victims of the genocide and the survivors of the massacres at the
Parish of Sainte Famille) in June 1995, he was—following the hiring of top-flight
Parisian lawyers by the French Catholic Church to defend their priest, much legal
wrangling, and a series of convoluted and highly illogical legal decisions—set free. This
was a man who not only ‘‘let the interahamwe roam around the church freely, drawing
up their death-lists, but exposed us to danger by calling [the Tutsis] Inyenzi in front of
them [the Interahamwe]’’ (71). His release constituted a gross mismanagement of
the legal system and a horrible insult to those seeking justice on behalf of those Tutsis
who were murdered because of his actions and his failures to act (e.g., his silence in the
face of the murderous activities of the Interahamwe and other Hutu extremists)
during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.
This ninety-six-page book begins with a succinct but valuable discussion of
the background leading up to the massacres perpetrated at the Parish of Sainte
Famille in Kigali; the massacres themselves; the role of Father Munyeshyaka during
the period of the massacres; the political influence of the Catholic Church in Rwanda;
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a summary of the charges against Munyeshyaka as they stood in 1999; the legal
proceedings against him through 1999; and the ongoing debate in France over
his innocence or guilt, as well as ‘‘a plea for action’’ by Africa Rights, calling on
the Catholic Church to make ‘‘an effort to establish the validity of claims against
the [Rwandan] clergy’’ and to bring those cases to justice that merit it (10).
The rest of the book (11–96) features more than forty first-person accounts by
survivors of the Sainte Famille massacres. In addition to harrowing accounts of the
murder of innocents, these first-person statements provide a host of information
about those who sought shelter at the parish; the vastly different ways in which
Hutu and Tutsi were treated by the different parish fathers; Munyeshyaka’s
relationships with the Hutu extremists, the Tutsis, and the general Hutu population;
the views Munyeshyaka espoused during his sermons, in which he denigrated the
Tutsis, accused them of culpability for the ongoing civil conflict, and stated that they
should suffer accordingly; his selection of those who would be allowed to seek the
protection of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and those who, in his eyes, ‘‘deserved’’
to be killed by the Interahamwe; and his rape of young girls (and the ‘‘gifts’’ and
‘‘penalties’’ he presented or meted out to those who ‘‘accepted’’ or ‘‘rejected’’ his
predatory sexual advances).
One survivor/witness after another—including many who had known
Munyeshyaka for years, attended his church, and even considered him a friend—
comment on how his personality changed at the beginning of the genocide, how he had
taken on a new persona. A classic example is his change in dress: he replaced
his cassock with a bulletproof vest and wore a pistol on his person even while
celebrating mass. There were even times when he carried grenades and a rifle.
Munyeshyaka’s deliberate inaction in the face of certain murder of Tutsis
speaks volumes about his role as a collaborator with the Interahamwe, the
Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), and other extremists. Indeed, his lack of care for the
plight of the Tutsis who had sought sanctuary at Sainte Famille is overt proof of the
hate in his heart—a far cry, obviously, from the compassion usually associated
(perhaps naı¨vely) with a man of the cloth. In decrying Munyeshyaka’s lack of care,
a survivor observes that
Munyeshyaka refused us water and provisions, which caused the death of several
people—the sick, elderly and children. We often went for several days without eating or
drinking anything, though there were supplies in the Ste. Famille store. (39)
Discussing the evacuation of Tutsis to a safe area controlled by the RPF, another
survivor notes that
On several occasions when UNAMIR came to evacuate refugees, [Munyeshyaka] was
[deliberately] nowhere to be seen. He was absent. [Y]et, he was the only one who could
give UNAMIR the order to start evacuating people to the FAR or RPF sections. (91)
But Munyeshyaka’s behavior was not limited to inaction. For example, as one survivor
notes,
Munyeshyaka put guards at the entrance to Ste. Famille. They demanded a high price
before they let in Tutsi who were running away from the interahamwe. Those who could
not find money were refused entry. Their death was then certain because the
interahamwe nearby were on the look-out. (64)
Munyeshyaka also took an active role in targeting those he believed should be
murdered. Indeed, his selection of those who were to live and those who were to die is a
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grim reminder of the actions of Dr. Josef Mengele at the Auschwitz death camp.
One survivor of Sainte Famille tells the following tale:
As I was responsible for the refugees at Ste. Famille, I told Munyeshyaka that we
should begin by evacuating the young men, who were most sought after by the
interahamwe.
He [Munyeshyaka] spat at me and said, ‘‘You are really stupid. Don’t you know that
these are our future enemies who are going to swell the ranks of the RPF? They must all
be killed.’’ (12)
. . . Instead of following the alphabetical lists [requested by the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Rwanda and which contained the names of those who wished
to be relocated to an RPF stronghold], he passed these on to the interahamwe.
Munyeshyaka did not want the men to be evacuated. (13)
Another survivor/witness notes that
The interahamwe were watching out for those who had the forbidden wish to go to
Kabuga [in the RPF-controlled zone]. Munyeshyaka had given them the list. Many of
these were killed before being evacuated. (16)
Another survivor reports that
During the first evacuation, Munyeshyaka described the Tutsi refugees as Inyenzi
[‘‘cockroaches’’—the derogatory term for the Tutsi used by extremist Hutus], in the
presence of militia who surrounded us. Afterwards, he asked us: ‘‘Who knows how to
write?’’ I held up my hand, Munyeshyaka stared at me with a terrible look in his eyes
and said, ‘‘Write down only the names of the members of your family and yourself.’’
I immediately scribbled down the names of the remaining members of my family,
not forgetting to write down my own. I even went beyond the instructions I was
given and put other people on the list, like my friends who were waiting to be
evacuated by UNAMIR. Munyeshayaka had also chosen Hyacinthe Rwanga to do the
same thing.
That night the RPF rescued the refugees from St. Paul [a pastoral centre in Kigali].
The next day, 17 June, we were astonished to hear the militia who had come
to take reprisals, asking for the people who had written the lists the day before:
Hyacinthe and myself. They were violent and we scattered ourselves throughout
the enclosure. They shot many young women and two women, Hyacinthe and ‘‘Teteri.’’
(17–18)
And according to yet another survivor,
During the evacuation, the priest [Munyeshyaka] turned against those who wanted to
go to the RPF Zone. [Not only did he] give the assassins a copy of the list of names before
the evacuation took place, he limited the number of people to be evacuated, although
there was no lack of space. He refused to let me go to the RPF area, by repeatedly
erasing my name from the evacuation list. (38)
As for Munyeshyaka’s relationship with the killers, a survivor/witness asserts
the following:
Munyeshyaka held meetings with killers like pre´fet Tharcisee Renzako, councilor
Odette Nyirabagenzi, and inspector Angeline in his small office. I saw all of this because
I was a member of the committee [in charge of internal security] within Ste. Famille.
The military men were from Rugenge . . .After these meetings, the killers would send
their militiamen to abduct Tutsis to murder. (56)
One survivor after another comments on Munyeshyaka’s use and abuse of the
most beautiful girls who had sought refuge in Sainte Famille: the priest, they state,
had his security men search out the prettiest girls, lodged them directly next door to
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his own room, and ‘‘visited’’ them nightly; he provided these girls and women with
extra food and took care of them and their families by providing sanctuary for them
at the Hotel Mille Collines. Some also recount how he saw to it that one woman,
Hyacinthe Rwanga, who rejected his advances, was shot and murdered by the Hutu
militia:
He [Munyeshyaka] liked girls a lot. One day Hyacinthe [a Tutsi teenager] went into his
room to beg him to hide her, but he began to kiss and caress her. Hyacinthe refused and
came back crying. When I asked her why she was crying, she told me that
Munyeshayaka wanted to rape her. (75)
Some of Munyeshyaka’s actions were a throwback to the Nazis’ charade at
Theresienstadt. During the winter of 1943, the Danish Red Cross submitted a request
to the Nazis to allow it to inspect the camp. The Nazis agreed to the visit, but insisted
that it be done at a later time. In the ensuing months, the Nazis forced Jewish
prisoners to create a fac¸ade for the camp, transforming their filthy and depressing
prison into a sparkling clean and pretty place by painting walls, planting flowers,
and ‘‘disposing of excess bodies’’ by shipping them off to death camps. Prior to the visit
by the Red Cross officials, the Nazis instructed the prisoners, on the threat of death,
what to say and how to say it. In the end, the ruse worked, and the Red Cross walked
away satisfied that all was well within the camp. Similarly, a survivor of the Rwandan
Genocide asserts that
one day, journalists [from RTLM], including a Belgian who worked for RTLM, Georges
Ruggiu, were accompanied by military officers. . . .That day Munyeshyaka had chosen
four refugees, three Tutsi boys and myself. He had taken us aside and told us: ‘‘You are
going to be interviewed by journalists from RTLM who want to talk with the
accomplices of the Inyenzi-Inkotanyi. I expect you to say that you are well, that you are
eating, that you wash yourselves, and that your enemy is the RPF. You must also add
that you are counting on the victory of the FAR to save you.’’ So that was how we spoke
to these journalists telling them all the things which Munyeshyaka dictated to us.
I remember that I gave a false name to these journalists during the introductions. (41)
The facts and stories related in this book, along with the reality that it has taken
well over a decade for the international community to hold Munyeshyaka responsible
for his murderous actions (or, so it appears at the time of writing—and, in fact,
the latter is contingent on whether the French either honor the Rwandan
government’s request for Munyeshyaka’s extradition or decide to move forward with
their own trial in France and avoid allowing some slick law firm and the Catholic
Church to turn justice on its head), raise a host of questions—questions about
the seriousness of the international community’s commitment to ending impunity for
ge´nocidaires, about the justness of the judicial systems of certain nations (in this case,
France), and about why the Catholic Church has such a tortuously difficult time
coming to grips with the fact that genocide is an abomination and that, if its brethren
and leaders are culpable for its perpetration, then they deserve to face both the justice
system and their maker but certainly do not deserve to be protected from prosecution
by the Church itself. Each question-cum-issue is ripe, of course, for additional
research, but, even more significantly, it is high time for each to be addressed in the
most concrete terms possible in order to ameliorate the problems they pose for our
world in its ongoing struggle with what it means to be civilized.
Throughout the book, many survivors/witnesses compare and contrast
Munyeshyaka’s wicked behavior with that of certain other priests who helped
the Tutsis—most notably Father Ce´lestin Hakizimana, who showed great courage,
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love, and care in his efforts to help the refugees who were in such dire straits. His own
insights and his condemnation of Munyeshyaka’s demonic demeanor and actions
close the book. He concludes his highly informative statement with the following
words: ‘‘I hope that Fr. Munyeshyaka will be brought to justice’’ (96). All one can really
say in response is, Amen.
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Editor’s Introduction
Fourteen years have passed since the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, during which an
estimated 500,000 to 800,000 (or more) Tutsis and moderate Hutus died at the hands
of extremists Hutus. Rwanda is still in the process of recovering from the genocide,
which not only resulted in vicious and mass murder but virtually destroyed the
country’s infrastructure. Like any nation reconstituting itself in the aftermath of
genocide, Rwanda is experiencing growing pains. Survivors continue to suffer the ill
effects of what they were subjected to, witnessed, and lost. Many of the women who
were raped now have AIDS. Those who gave birth to what are commonly referred to as
‘‘rape babies’’ face additional psychological turmoil and, in many cases, are ostracized
by neighbors, friends, and family members. Many of the babies have been maltreated,
neglected, and even left to their own devices to eke out an existence on the streets.
Orphans fill orphanages, where many of the youngest children are raised by the
‘‘older’’ (often teenage) orphans. Groups of widows have banded together to provide
mutual support and get back on their feet while dealing with the absence of beloved
husbands and children. Many individuals are so scarred by what they experienced
and witnessed that they are not able to function and carry on normal lives. The
medical and social-services communities are stretched so thin in attempting to provide
assistance to those in need that people often fall through the cracks or simply do
not receive the treatment they need in order to fully regain their health
(whether physical or psychological). Some 100,000 alleged perpetrators still remain
in Rwandan prisons. Three different court systems—the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (Arusha, Tanzania), the national courts of Rwanda, and gacaca
(the adaptation of precolonial mediation and reconciliation processes to try, today,
those who are suspected of having carried out the killing and mass rapes) are currently
in operation.
At the same time, Rwanda has made a remarkable comeback. The country is,
for the most part, peaceful, and the people, for the most part, seem to get along, even
if their daily dealings with one another—particularly between those who considered
themselves Tutsi and those who considered themselves Hutu during the genocide—are
often tentative, if not tenuous. The national government has mandated that Rwandan
citizens are no longer Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa, as they were prior to and during the
genocidal period, but ‘‘simply’’ Rwandans. Some, and possibly many, look askance at
such a mandate, considering it naı¨ve at best and repressive at worst, but many others
seem to believe that, over time, it may be the best way to prevent future incidents of
mass violence. Time will tell.
Over the past fourteen years a massive amount of scholarship (including journal
articles and books) has been published on various facets of the Rwandan Genocide.
Some of it has provided a clearer understanding of how genocide unfolds—in
particular, how masses of people are induced to take part in the bloody and brutal
killing of former neighbors, friends, and even loved ones.
This special issue on Rwanda includes three articles based on field research
conducted in the hills, fields, and towns of Rwanda. The first, ‘‘A Calamity in the
Neighbourhood: Women’s Participation in the Rwandan Genocide,’’ is by Reva Adler,
Cyanne E. Loyle, and Judith Globerman; the second, ‘‘Interethnic Marriages,
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the Survival of Women, and the Logics of Genocide in Rwanda,’’ is by Anuradha
Chakravarty, a PhD candidate at Cornell University; the third, ‘‘The Dynamics of
Genocide,’’ is by University of Wisconsin at Madison political scientist Scott Straus.
Adler (Clinical Associate Professor in the Department of Medicine at the
University of British Columbia), Loyle (a graduate fellow in the University of
Maryland’s Department of Government and Politics), and Globerman (an associate
professor at the Institute for Health Promotion Research at the University of British
Columbia) focus on why women assaulted or murdered targeted victims during the
1994 Rwandan Genocide. During the course of their study, the three researchers found
that four experiential pressures, in various combinations, shaped the female
perpetrators’ decisions to participate in the 1994 genocide: ‘‘disaster mentality; fear
of the new social order; confusion or ambivalence about events on the ground; and
consonance and dissonance vis-a`-vis gender roles.’’
Chakravarty discusses the gendered dimensions of the genocide in Rwanda.
In doing so, she seeks to explain why Tutsi women married to Hutu men appear to
have had a better chance of survival than Tutsi women married to Tutsi men or even
Hutu women married to Tutsi men. Based on data from a field site in southwest
Rwanda, her findings and insights draw on the gendered, racial, and operational
dynamics of the genocide as it unfolded between April and July 1994.
In ‘‘The Dynamics of Genocide,’’ Straus delineates some of the many key findings of
his research in Rwanda, findings that constitute the heart of his new book, The Order
of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Cornell University Press, 2006). The
Order of Genocide raises critical questions about previous assumptions about the 1994
genocide (many of which have been taken at face value), and also provides new insights
into a variety of significant issues, including how the killing process spread across
Rwanda and why. Three specialists on the Rwandan Genocide—Lars Waldorf, who is
currently Lecturer in International Law and Human Rights at the University
of London and is writing a book on Rwanda’s gacaca process; Thierry Cruvellier,
a journalist and justice expert who has written a book on the ICTR; and Lee Ann Fujii,
a political scientist at George Washington University, who is in the process of
completing her own book on the 1994 Rwandan Genocide—were asked by the editor to
write succinct critiques of Straus’s research and findings, noting key strengths, any
weaknesses and gaps, and the likely ramifications of the findings.
Linda Melvern, an investigative journalist and the author of two notable works on
the 1994 Rwandan Genocide—Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (Verso,
2004) and A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (Zed Books,
2000)—contributes a provocative and insightful piece titled ‘‘The UK Government and
the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.’’ More specifically, Melvern focuses on the role of the
British government of John Major during the period of the genocide (April to July
1994), noting, and then discussing, the fact that in the United Kingdom neither
Parliament nor the press has attempted to account for Britain’s policies toward
Rwanda, and there seems to be an ongoing reluctance to do so.
This issue also includes a commentary by long-time Africanist Gerry Caplan.
In his contribution, ‘‘Rwanda (and Other Genocides) in Perspective,’’ Caplan examines
a host of issues but keeps circling back to one question: ‘‘What good has the UN
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide done?’’ He
also argues, and understandably, that ‘‘so long as the Permanent Five (P5) of the UN
Security Council have no will to intervene, or interest in intervening, in potential or
actual genocides, all the UN conventions, reports, and articles aren’t worth much at
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all.’’ In turn, Caplan prods us to ponder the real value of the proliferation of studies,
reports, journal articles, and books on genocide. It is an issue worthy of ample thought:
one genocide precedes another like clockwork in our world, and little or nothing has yet
been created, let alone implemented, to halt, let alone prevent, the one that always
seems to be just around the corner.
Undoubtedly, over time, many more studies will be conducted and many more
articles and books will be written and published about various facets of the 1994
Rwandan genocide. Those who undertake to write about Rwanda in the future would
do well to treat the subject as seriously and with as much care as those whose work is
represented in this special issue.
Samuel Totten
GSP Co-editor
Notes
1. Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
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